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New Ways of Protecting Collective
Interests: Italian Class Litigation




Collective interests can be defined as interests that are common to all members
of a particular group or collectivity. Collective interests have increased in relevance
in modern times, and their legal protection raises serious challenges grounded in
both collective entities and the structure of representative litigation. The
standardization of productive and commercial activities is enough to call into
question the need for protecting substantive interests beyond individual
expectations. Individual litigation is ill–suited to the context of collective interests,
creating excessive individual costs and diluting the benefits of a stable judicial
decision. A plurality of individual lawsuits evidences the difficulties inherent in the
management of different, yet similar, cases.
The standardization of disputes impedes courts frommanaging similar disputes
through the joinder of additional parties or consolidation of separate proceedings.
When the parties are numerous, such that it is impractical for them to pursue their
claims individually, joinder of claims and consolidation of proceedings do not
necessarily carry the typical benefits of decisional efficiency and consistency. The
reason for seeking alternative solutions is that conventional methods of joinder or
consolidation, as compared to class litigation, significantly increase the amount of
energy and time necessary to resolve cases that come before the court. Legal
systems have gradually infused their procedural rules with a preference for
representative litigation in order to reduce the costs of individual litigation and the
risks of decisional inconsistency.
The very nature of collective interests requires a conceptual move away from
an individual approach to litigation toward a representative system of judicial
protection. Legal systems must overcome qualms about representative litigation to
permit a party to bring a lawsuit on behalf of other members of a group or
collectivity. To the extent collective interests represent a synthesis of individual
interests of the groups members with respect to a given event or good, group
activism is a legitimate reason for affording legal protection to collective interests.
Collective interests can also be served by acknowledging that a member of a
collectivity can fulfill collective interests on behalf of other members. In such a
case, the activism of the representative member affords collective interests, and thus
the interests of other group members, the legal protections they are due.
First, Section II of this Article analyzes the various components of the
protection of collective interests and the relationships among them. Such an
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analysis reveals the rightful role of the representative claimant as a means of
enhancing protection of collective interests. The role of the representative claimant
is comprised of various factors ranging from the nuanced relationship between the
group or collectivity and its individual members to the impact of collective interests
as an overarching synthesis of individual expectations. Thus, the representative
claim reveals itself as the most palatable solution to the problem of protecting
collective interests. The attention collective interests receive from interested parties
has empowered legal systems to craft, by virtue of the Anglo–American system,
varying tools to manage the representative protection of collective interests. Legal
systems have invested time and resources to allow representative entities, such as
environmental or consumer organizations, to protect collective interests on behalf
of an entire group or collectivity, demonstrating the legal regard for the importance
of representative litigation as a means of prohibiting or impeding unfair practices
against the group or collectivity as a whole. The same systems have authorized
each member of the group or collectivity to bring civil lawsuits on behalf of other
members, thereby reflecting the belief that representative litigation is a suitable
means of protecting those individual interests that are commonly intertwined with
the interests of a group or collectivity. Therefore, the path of representative
litigation has developed not only around the need for preventive measures, implying
that unfair practices are repeated over time, but also around derivative or class
actions to protect individual interests of stakeholders that cannot be undermined by
a common event without compensation.
Next, Section III this Article outlines a proposal for enhancing the existing
Italian system of protection of individual interests that are intertwined with
collective interests. The first step is an analysis of the Italian class action under
existing legal rules, which provide the basis for determining the scope and operation
of class actions within the Italian legal system. By comparing the Italian class
action with other legal systems of class litigation, the analysis brings advantages
and disadvantages of the Italian collective action to the forefront. The second (and
more challenging) step is the creation of an interpretative framework for assessing
whether class actions can be submitted to domestic arbitration under Italian
procedural law on class actions and the intervention of third parties in proceedings.
The focus on class arbitration has implications for the scope of protection of
individual and collective interests. If a class–wide arbitration increases the
likelihood that stakeholders expectations receive serious consideration and
protection notwithstanding the consensual basis of arbitration, it creates several
problems by altering the usual legal approach to multiparty disputes within arbitral
proceedings. Admitting a class action arbitration under existing Italian law
provides a foundation for a full appreciation of the Italian legal system and its
potential.
II. THE PROTECTION OFCOLLECTIVE INTERESTS: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
The process of protecting collective rights in Italy while resolving multiparty
litigation has undergone crucial changes in recent times. The traditional approach
to judicial protection is constructed around individual rights and individual access
to justice rather than collective interests and collective litigation. So well
2
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established is the relevance of individual rights1 that even when they are linked to
collective situations or are widely shared, the judicial protection afforded by legal
rules and remedies depends on the possibility that stakeholders claim their
expectations as individuals. The reason for favoring such doctrines comes from a
tradition in civil law countries of emphasizing an inherent link between individual
rights and their claims of protection.2
Traditional concepts and practices have become less important and less
acceptable when economic and social developments have necessitated relevant
changes in the procedural rules. Italian law is moving to protect individual rights
at large, meaning remedying those collective offenses which derive from legal or
commercial actions intended to produce collective results. Thus, it is perfectly
appropriate for the modern Italian legal system to pay careful attention to collective
or representative interests3 and to the common law tradition of class and derivative
1. In this Article, the term ìrightê means ìlegal right,ê or a substantive claim expressly justified by
the legal system. See generally Dwight G. Newman, Collective Interests and Collective Rights, 49 AM.
J. JURIS. 127, 128 (2004) (ìA legal right is an entitlement or justified claim that a legal system recognizes
according to the correct interpretation of its own rules and principles, though a legal system or actors
within it may incorrectly fail to recognize a legal right in particular circumstances.ê). Further, the
difference between ìinterestê and ìrightê as discussed here revolves around the recognition of the legal
system. A claim is said to be an ìinterestê when it exists in practice as a subjective aspiration to an
economic or noneconomic advantage, regardless of whether the legal system has recognized it as a legal
right. See id. at 129–30 (ì[A]n interest is a relation specifying something (an object, being a description
of an alteration to the state of the world) that makes someones life (the subjects) go better overall.
Interests, then, are not subjective preferences but objective relations between a subject and an object
describing what objects make the subjects life go better overallê (emphasis and footnote omitted)).
Alternatively, a claim is a ìrightê or ìlegal rightê when it is entitled to legal protection. According to
the civil law tradition, when a claim is legally relevant, it shows its nature in the fact that the claimant
has effective remedy for his claim (ubi ius, ibi remedium: where there is a right, there is a remedy).
Conversely, the common law tradition is historically most compatible with a view of ìlegal rightê that
contemplates its judicial assertion (ubi remedium, ibi ius: where there is a remedy, there is a right). See,
e.g., J.A. Jolowicz, Protection of Diffuse, Fragmented and Collective Interests in Civil Litigation:
English Law, 42 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 222, 225 (1983); see also Frank I. Michelman, Unenumerated Rights
Under Popular Constitutionalism, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 121, 127–30 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Thomas D. Jr. Rowe,Debates Over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspectives: What
Can We Learn from Each Other?, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INTLL. 157, 159 (2001) (ìIn civil law countries
there is a powerful doctrinal emphasis on the individual nature of a legal claim of right, going beyond a
presumption in favor of proceeding on ones own. . . . Restrictive standing doctrines, governing who is
entitled to bring various types of claims, can impede collective litigation by associations on behalf of
their members.ê); MAURO CAPPELLETTI& JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY 42 (1965)
(noting that ìthe private dispositive nature of the substantive rights protected by civil courts required
that parties be permitted to select the facts to be presented for adjudication, to abandon litigation, and to
refrain from appeal.ê); Douglas L. Parker, Standing to Litigate -Abstract Social Interests+ in the United
States and Italy: Reexamining -Injury in Fact+, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 259, 272–82 (1995);
Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry,
6 TEMP. INTL&COMP. L.J. 217, 264–92 (1992). Similarly, the common law tradition has characterized
the individual approach to litigation as a basic legal principle. See, e.g., Jolowicz, supra note 1, at 226
(noting that ìa èright is coextensive with its protection through the actions of the law, that is with the
availability of a legal remedy from the courts.ê); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing
Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 561 (1987) (ìFrom the perspective of the
common law tradition of individual justice, class actions are a necessary evil, but an evil nonetheless.ê);
Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011) (stating that ì[t]he class action is èan exception
to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.ê
(quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979))).
3. See David Feldman, Public Interest Litigation and Constitutional Theory in Comparative
Perspective, 55 MOD. L. REV. 44, 45 (1992) (ìInterest groups sometimes represent the interests of their
members; at other times, they claim to be advancing interests which go beyond those of their immediate
membership.ê); Newman, supra note 1, at 140 (noting that ì[g]iven that an interest is something that
3
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actions. The redesigned approach to judicial protection in matters of consumer
contracts and commercial transactions has already reached the result of serving and
achieving collective interests in a more effective way than in the past.4
Nevertheless, a gap remains. For several decades, the Italian legal system has
described collective interests as legally irrelevant unless they can be viewed through
a lens of individual rights.5
A. Historical Premises
The protection of individual rights is an essential feature of the European legal
tradition.6 The idea is that the relevance of substantive rights is strictly correlated
with a constitutional right to process that is exclusively individual.7 Such an idea
depends on a large number of factors that align with the basic and original meaning
of judicial protection in civil law countries. The political philosophy of European
countries embraced the protection of individual interests as a governing principle
and, in turn, shaped the ways in which litigants came before the courts: individually.
The reason for the individual focus, which developed during the Nineteenth
makes someones life go better, then, a collective interest is something that makes a collectivitys life go
better. That life, consisting of the collectivitys flourishing as it contributes to the lives of its members
and their purposes in coming together in the collectivity, can guide us toward a concept of collective
interest.ê).
4. See, e.g., Jules Stuyck, Public and Private Enforcement in Consumer Protection: General
Comparison EUæUSA, in NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 63 (Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans–W. Micklitz eds., 2009); Norbert
Reich & Hans–W. Micklitz, Economic Law, Consumer Interests, and E.U. Integration, in EUROPEAN
CONSUMER LAW 6 (Norbert Reich et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2014) (noting that ì[t]he consumer rights as an
individual and as a collective supplement the principle of private autonomy which is generally
recognised by E.U. law.ê).
5. See Parker, supra note 2, at 280 (noting that ìthe civil law tradition of individual rights as the basis
for litigation has created problems where the rights alleged have been collective or diffuse in nature . . .
and where the courts have not been comfortable finding that the right claimed has an individual
èowner.ê). For the English law tradition, see Jolowicz, supra note 1, at 227 (ìAt least according to
English ideas, if no available criteria [for the judicial resolution of disputes involving diffuse or
fragmented interests] are to be found in the law, then an issue is not justiciable.ê); see also Newman,
supra note 1, at 151–52 (ìIn an account based on an aggregation of individual interests, it is unclear what
would differentiate an interest èas a member from any other interest. We can make this concept clear
when we accept the possibility of a collective interest.ê).
6. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN
EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 88 (2008) (ìEuropean legal systems have been based on the paradigm that
the disputes that are to be resolved arise between individuals. If a mechanism is introduced into such a
system that individual cases are not to be permitted to proceed, but will be resolved, at least in part, by
deciding an issue which the court selects, and (more importantly) in which all individuals cannot be
represented, an issue of individual rights and representation will obviously arise.ê); BJARTE THORSON,
INDIVIDUALRIGHTS IN E.U. LAW 89 (2016) (noting that ìit is inherent in the idea of judicial protection
that the remedy must correspond to the right.ê); Thomas Eilmansberger, The Relationship Between
Rights and Remedies in EC Law: In Search of the Missing Link, 41 CML REV. 1199, 1203 (2004)
(arguing that ì[f]rom the very beginning[,] . . . a close connection between the concepts of individual
rights protection on the one hand, and direct applicability [of EC law] on the other, was established.ê).
7. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN THE COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 268
(1989); Feldman, supra note 3, at 70 (ìThe extent to which public law systems accommodate litigation
in support of public rights and interests is an indication of underlying notions of citizenship, particularly
the relationship set between public and private interests and the public rights and capacities of
individuals.ê); see also Art. 24(1) Costituzione [Cost.] [hereinafter Italian Constitution], translated and
reprinted in ITALIANCONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE INGLOBALCONTEXT app. I (Vittoria Barsotti et al. eds.,
2016).
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Centurys codification debate in Europe, was that the legislature infused the law
with qualities of certainty, clarity, and reliability. Codificationîthe historical
process of collecting and restating the unworkable and confusing laws in force in
several European countries until the Eighteenth Century (e.g., the Roman law, the
customary law, and legal opinions)8îfacilitated the pursuit of those qualities and
reflected a vision of legal relationships among citizens as separate from
relationships between citizens and public powers. Because such a vision
emphasized the role of private property and contract rights in the new legal
landscape,9 there was a need to afford judicial protection to individual or personal
interests relating to such rights.
While this visionwas valid in the post–codification era, it proved unsatisfactory
in modern times. In the context of industrial activity and contractual
standardization, the value of individual subjectivity decreased. The new role of
judicial protection is, in large part, defined by the need to assess how economic and
social interests might be affected by increased industrial production and the crucial
consequences of contractual standardization.10 The effect is a gradual move away
from an exclusively individual approach to substantive rights and toward their
conceptual enlargement. As new economic activities began to involve industrial
products, and as new social and economic needs came to be served by the same
types of large–scale businesses, the legal debate shifted in a meaningful way. A
conceptual shift from individual interests was required to warrant a wider view of
judicial protection. Accordingly, the shift created new categories of substantive
rights relating to specific groups of people and not to individuals or organizations.11
8. Cf. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (1764) reprinted in ON CRIMES AND
PUNISHMENTANDOTHERWRITINGS 3 (1995) (ìA few odd remnants of the laws of an ancient conquering
race codified twelve hundred years ago by a prince ruling at Constantinople, and since jumbled together
with the customs of the Lombards and bundled up in the rambling volumes of obscure academic
interpretersîthis is what makes up the tradition of opinions that passes for law across a large portion of
Europe.ê).
9. Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187, 206 (1992)
(ìThe modern civil rights laws should be understood as collective and misguided efforts to limit the
normal bundle of rights associated with property, without identifying any of the problems of bargaining
breakdown that might justify a different form of property rights.ê); Maria Lee, The Public Interest in
Private Insurance: Collectives and Communities in Tort, 74 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 329 (2015) (ìThe place of
public interests is at the core of some of the most central divisions in the way we understand tort law.ê).
10. See, e.g., Mauro Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest Through the Courts: A
Comparativist’s Contribution, 25 BUFFALO L. REV. 643, 645 (1976) (emphasizing ìthe emergence and
growth of such phenomena, practically unknown in pre–industrial societies, as the massive organization
of labor, the unprecedented dimension of class conflicts, the rise of the mass–oriented èwelfare state
government, and the often frightening development of a mass psychology, molded by modern mass
media.ê); Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action, 49 INTL ORG.
595, 597 (1995).
11. See generally JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); see also George Rainbolt, What are Group Rights?, in
GROUPS AND GROUP RIGHTS 78 (Christine Sistare et al. eds., 2001); James Griffin, Group Rights, in
RIGHTS, CULTURE AND THE LAW: THEMES FROM THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH
RAZ 161 (Lukas H. Meyer et al. eds., 2003) (ìGroup rights–at least the most interesting form of them–
are supposed not to be reducible to the individual rights of their members. They are supposed to be
rights that groups have as groups.ê); Newman, supra note 1, at 130 (describing the concept of a collective
interest as ìthe interest of a collectivity.ê). On the role of collective interests in the realm of human
rights, see generally Margo Kaplan, Using Collective Interests to Ensure Human Rights: An Analysis of
the Articles on State Responsibility, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1902 (2004).
5
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Consider, for example, the fact that many industrial processes produce various
pollutant emissions and cause damage to people living in nearby areas.12 If the need
for inhabitants to eliminate or reduce the risk of collective injuries is both
reasonable and entitled to judicial protection, there exists an opportunity to
reconsider the scope of compensable damages. When the question arises as to
whether the courts are called upon to grant special protection to the natural
environment beyond the individual harms caused by the pollutant emissions, the
answer must move beyond the category of individual interests and toward the
interest of a qualified collectivity. The initial step toward a new perspective on
compensable damages in these cases is to recognize that the status of relevant
interests should be reconstituted around the individual–collectivity dichotomy.
While the meager economic resources of stakeholders place meaningful limits on
individual litigation, the qualified collectivitys claim for relief gives stakeholders
the assurance that the groups interest is collectively, though not individually,
protected. Ultimately, the premise of the individual–collectivity dichotomy
suggests the need for representative lawsuits. When the representative claimant
brings an individual lawsuit for money damages on behalf of other stakeholders, the
interests of the groups members are individually satisfied without the need for
individual claims.
B. The Structure of Collective Interests
Judicial protection of individual rights is crucial on both theoretical and
practical grounds. There are several situations in which a given type of substantive
interest is related to all members of the same group or collectivity.13 To continue
the above scenario, legal systems allow individuals to bring suits against the polluter
when the emissions have caused personal injuries. The expectations of individuals
of a pollution–free environment, however, are usually dismissed because there is
no individual right to a pollution–free environment; the interest in environmental
conservation is a public interest.14 Thus, when such an interest is invoked to defend
the environment as a public good, the government is called upon to tailor its
regulations and prosecute the polluter to serve that interest, and when it is invoked
to defend the expectations of those who live in the polluted area, it is commonly
described as the interest of a qualified group or collectivity. Similar situations have
provided the basis for shaping functional doctrines of collective interests in several
12. See Cerny, supra note 10, at 612 (ì[T]he most salient new sector of redistributive public goods,
environmental protection, is especially transnational in character; pollution and the depletion of natural
resources do not respect borders.ê).
13. See Newman, supra note 1, at 128–29 (ìA collectivity is a collection of persons such that we
would still identify it as the same collectivity were some or all of the persons in the collectivity to change
(provided that the collectivity continued to meet some other conditions) and such that the persons who
are in the collectivity identify themselves in some non–trivial way as members of this collectivity. It is
thus a number of persons gathered together and reasonably perceived in at least some way and for some
purposes as forming a single unit.ê).
14. See, e.g., Jenny Steele, Private Law and the Environment: Nuisance in Context, 15 LEGAL STUD.
236, 242 (1995) (enumerating the ìways in which developments in environmental law, or the growing
realisation of the importance of environmental policy, might impact on the way that private law rights
are understood and enforced.ê).
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civil law countries that ultimately increase the procedural safeguards of substantive
interests by adopting a broader view of their legal relevance.15
While it is foreseeable that public powers may fail to effectively protect the
public interest in environmental conservation, it is possible to view the collective
interest in conserving a given environment as an alternative and efficient way of
protecting individual interests. The governmental failure to protect a public good
or prevent damaging situations from coming to pass depends on considerations of
public inefficiencies and costs.16 To the contrary, groups or communities can be
viewed as qualified to serve collective interests when their members are directly
involved in cases concerning such groups or communities. If the members of a
group take their collective interests into account, and if they believe that such
interests are gravely harmed, then they are highly likely to act on their own initiative
in order to warrant some degree of protection for their common interests. The fact
that collective interests are best served by themembers of the group largely depends
on the direct impact of wrongdoing upon the group identity. The pollution of a
given area upsets the expectations of its inhabitants independently of their
individual damages. For instance, pollution could harm not only their individual
health, but also the wellness and wealth of their group.17 Evaluating how useful or
harmful it would be to defend such a collective interest requires the speed of private
decision–making and the expenditure of resources, economic and otherwise, to
warrant protection on judicial grounds.
This pragmatic approach is markedly different from the limited capacity of the
government to serve a public interest. Attention to public interests often requires
government officials to balance competing concerns and outweigh the uncertainty
and slowness created by administrative procedures.18 It is sensible for public
15. SeeArthur R. Miller,Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the Class
Action Problem, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 668 (1979) (ì[I]t is becoming increasingly obvious that the
traditional notion of civil litigation as merely bilateral private dispute resolution is outmoded.ê); B.
Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 299, 309 (1972)
(ìWhereas our traditional ideas of substantive and procedural law derive from contemplating and
reacting to èA. v. B. as a single transaction, the world in which we must today make our legal concepts
work is a world of many As and Bs and many transactions.ê); Edward H. Cooper, Mass and Repetitive
Litigation in the Federal Courts, 38 S. C. L. REV. 489, 493 (1987) (noting that at the level of mass
litigation, ìthe transaction costs of adversary litigation . . . are a source of deep discomfortê while ì[the]
ability to achieve like treatment of like cases seems yet more uncertain.ê). For a comparative analysis,
see John L. Taylor & JohnW. Head, Representing Collective Interests in Civil Litigation: A Comparative
Synopsis, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 587 (1981).
16. See, e.g., Mancur Olson, Evaluating Performance in the Public Sector, in THEMEASUREMENT OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 358–59 (Milton Moss ed., 1973) (noting that ìgovernments . . .
are most often called upon to supply public or collective goods, or to control the production of those
with externalities, whereas the private sector is almost never paid . . . to deal with such goods. Those
goods or services that in almost every country are provided mainly by government (e.g., law and order,
defense, pure research, pollution control) are certainly collective goods or goods with more than average
externalities.ê).
17. The implications of a pollutant event can be complex, but it is possible to make a general
distinction between individual damages and collective damages. The former are damages posed by the
pollutant event in the private realm of every inhabitant. The latter are damages relating to the collective
sphere of the environmental conservation. It does not necessarily follow that lawsuits for collective
damages should preclude lawsuits for individual damages. Such actions are commonly described as
competing instruments for reinforcing the judicial protection of a given substantive interest. In practice,
however, the collective actions tend to prevail as more efficient than the individual ones.
18. See ROLAND N. MCKEAN, EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT THROUGH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS (1958);
see also Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A
Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 911 (1993) (ìThe costs are not only the direct
7
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powers to carefully consider any countervailing interests the law authorizes them to
evaluate. It is even more sensible for them to comply with those procedural
requirements necessary to warrant deference to administrative rules, such as
requiring independent agencies to submit information or making public expenditure
estimates before proposing an administrative act. It is in a groups best interest for
its members to promote the collective interest. Collective interests engender
collective reliance by encouraging group members to behave as though they are an
individual.19 Viewing the collective interest through the lens of individual
subjectivity is consistent with the possibility of full and rapid protection of a
collective interest. Expectations about collective protection depend not only on the
fact that the group may count on the expenditure of more economic resources than
an individual, but also on the fact that the group tends to inherently pay closer
attention to the interests of its members than do public powers.20
The first explanation challenges the assumption that stakeholders have several
possibilities to obtain protection of their individual or collective interests. As a
practical matter, the possibility that individual members may advocate for effective
protection of their collective interests is dwarfed by their usually limited financial
resources. However, even if limited resources present a significant obstacle to
individual initiatives, stakeholders can pool their resources together to protect their
collective interest(s) even when each of them would individually find it
economically disadvantageous. The increase in stakeholders confidence resulting
from the treatment of individual resources as a common means of bolstering
collective initiatives is a strong rationale for relying on the groups abilities.21
As noted above, the importance of collective initiatives may also stem from
another relevant factor grounded in the relationship between the structure of the
costs of government regulation, such as bureaucrats salaries, etc., but also the indirect costs in the form
of the rigidities and barriers to entry caused by government regulation.ê); Daniel A. Farber & Anne
Joseph OConnell, Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2014) (noting that it
is necessary to ìgive weight to the traditional administrative law values such as transparency and fidelity
to law, even though these goals may sometimes involve tradeoffs with agency efficiency and ability to
maximize social welfare. For instance, Congress may have had other goals than welfare maximization,
or the sole goal of efficiency may involve excessive sacrifices of fairness to individuals.ê).
19. See Newman, supra note 1, at 141 (ìThe collective interests of a particular collectivity are those
factors corresponding to its common good. They are not unrelated to members individual interests, for
the collectivitys moral existence depends on its ability to provide a collective interest that improves the
lives of its individual members. At the same time, the collective interest is not simply reducible to, or
even an aggregative function of, its members individual interests. It is, rather, a set of factors facilitating
the fulfillment of the individual interests of diverse members at the same time.ê).
20. See, e.g., Judith Reskin, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, WalæMart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 151 (2011) (noting that ìgroup litigation did work
for the state, as èthe king and barons . . . called groups into existence via incorporation so as to govern
them, and group solidarity emerged from sharing conditions on the ground (literally and
metaphorically).ê (quoting STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE
MODERN CLASS ACTION 83 (1987))); see also Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans–W. Micklitz, Collective
Enforcement of Consumer Law: A Framework for Comparative Assessment, 16 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L.
391, 402 (2008) (noting that ìconsumer organizations play a less important role in countries with a strong
consumer agency, and vice versa.ê).
21. Cf. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) (stating that class actions
ìmay enhance the efficacy of private actions by permitting citizens to combine their limited resources to
achieve a more powerful litigation posture.ê). See Cappelletti, supra note 10, at 660 (arguing that
ìmodern solutions [to the problem of protecting collective interests] consist of (a) utilizing the initiative
and zeal of private persons and organizations by allowing them to act in court for a general or group
interest . . . and (b) combining and integrating this private zeal with the initiative of, and/or control by,
government bodies.ê).
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group and the nature of the collective interest. Because the collective interest can
be described as the synthesis of its members interests, it is best served when the
stakeholders decide together to protect it. When stakeholders attempt to protect the
groups interest, they take care of their own individual interest.22 This can occur
when the stakeholders operate through a representative mechanismîfor example,
when the legal system authorizes a derivative or class action. It can also occur when
a group, such as an organization or an association, is entitled to sue (or be sued) on
behalf of all stakeholders. Thus, if it is economically preferable for the groups
members to take one collective initiative rather than one or more individual
initiatives, a collective action is also more effective at garnering rapid protection of
the collective interest than a public action initiated by public powers, primarily
because a collective interest is common to all the members of a given group.
Moreover, such an interest is commonly intertwined with the personal interests
of the groups members.23 The example of environmental pollution remains
instructive, as one or more collective interests, meaning those interests that belong
equally to each inhabitant of the polluted area (i.e., an interest in environmental
conservation or the prevention of pollution–related illness), are implicated by the
pollutant event. This, however, is not a justification for ignoring the individual
harms caused by the pollutant event, including the effect of the pollution on victims
and their families. The members of the group could potentially pursue two different
courses of action against the polluter: one results from the common environmental
violation, while the other depends on individual damages.24 Because the impact of
the pollutant event is collective, stakeholders are not individually entitled to sue the
polluter for the environmental harms caused by the event. By contrast, they are
entitled to sue the wrongdoer for compensation of their individual damages (e.g., a
particular instance of cancer stemming from exposure to carcinogenic pollutants).
This scenario reveals the very reason why a collective interest is relevant in the
aggregate, even across individual situations.25
22. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, An Optæin Option for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171, 189 (2016)
(ìThe class itself is in the best position to know its needs and the mechanism that best suits it.ê).
23. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 1, at 131 (arguing that ìa collectivity itself has individual members,
and its collective life is connected with their individual lives, so wemight wonder if there is some relation
between their individual interests and the collective interest.ê); see also William B. Fisch, European
Analogues to the Class Action: Group Action in France and Germany, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 51, 60 (1979);
Issacharoff & Samuel, supra note 4, at 50. For an application to consumer interests, see Reich &
Micklitz, supra note 4, at 7 (ìThe interests promoted and protected . . . could be described as èdiffuse
as they are not restricted to specific interest groups or a clearly definable set of people; they potentially
apply to any citizen or resident whatever their nationality.ê).
24. See Lee, supra note 9, at 343; see also Philip Alston, Representative Class Actions in
Environmental Litigation, 9 MELB. U. L. REV. 307, 308 (1973) (ìThe main factor deterring an individual
from taking action against a polluter frequently is cost. The expense involved in environmental
litigation, which often involves lengthy scientific investigation and evidence as well as prolonged legal
proceedings, would be prohibitive in many cases unless a class action was available.ê).
25. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3165, 3191 (2013) (ìAs society becomes more complex, the simpler solutions of town meetings in
the public domain and one–to–one contracts in the private domain become unwieldy, and a host of
intermediary institutional arrangement needs to be created.ê); Newman, supra note 1, at 131 (defining
the collective interest as ìa factor that contributes toward the continued collaboration of the members of
a community as viable and reasonable.ê); Lee, supra note 9, at 345 (ì[I]t is plausible that the group might
also represent something greater than, or distinct from, the sum of its parts, some version of the local or
community interest.ê); Hawaii, 405 U.S. at 266 (emphasizing the ìpsychological advantage in coming
before the court . . . not alone, as the representative of one, but on behalf of many.ê).
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The traditional conception of public powers presupposes a duty on the modern
administrative state to provide legal protection of public interests such as
environmental preservation. If safeguarding public and environmental health is one
of the most relevant concerns of a given community, it is a fundamental duty of
administrative agencies in the first place.26 Nevertheless, the fact remains that
environmental preservation requires some degree of procedural solicitude, so that it
is reasonable to assume that a community tends to be more solicitous for protection
of its own interest than a public authority for protection of the corresponding public
interest. If the time, expense, and uncertainty created by the operation of public
offices pose relevant obstacles to the efficacy of public action, collective interests
force stakeholders to expend energy and resources to effectively achieve a
collective protection of their groups interest.27 The conceptual departure from the
protection of individual interests toward the protection of collective interests
constitutes a safeguard against the limited activism of public powers. Finally, there
is much more reason to expect that any member of the group will advocate for
consideration of the collective interest than to expect the public power to pursue it.
A similar matter, relevant in cases involving social behaviors like pollution, is
visible in a variety of other cases concerned with certain legal behaviors.28 The
same social behavior tends to cause similar harm to all members of a given group
when the damages occur in the same factual context. When legal behaviors such as
product liability or breach of standard contractual clauses arise,29 the result is
similar to that of social behaviors. Much the same is true of the application of tort
law to unfair competitive practices when they engender unjust results such as the
formation of contracts or allocation of investments stemming from misleading
advertising.30 In such cases, stakeholders (consumers) play a role in serving
26. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975); Mauro Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest
in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, 73 MICH. L. REV. 793 (1975); Macey, supra note 18, at 911;
Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 218 (1993);
Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193,
1275–76.
27. See, e.g., Cappelletti, supra note 26, at 882 (noting that an ìimportant method [of protecting
collective interests] has been to encourage individuals and/or spontaneously organized groups to
represent vital community interests in court, conferring upon them the role of individual and
organizational èprivate attorneys general.ê (footnotes omitted)); Issacharoff & Samuel, supra note 23,
at 50 (arguing that ìprivate actors are largely responsible for seeking redress of their own injuries.ê).
28. The distinction between social and legal behavior is used here to suggest that sometimes unlawful
behaviors are those that derive directly from violations of general rules of legal protection independently
of legal activities, and at other times it is those that derive from (or are related to) activities in which
legal affairs (such as the formation of contracts, allocation of investments, and organization of business
operations) are involved. Such a distinction emphasizes the heterogeneity of situations in which the
protection of collective interests becomes relevant in practice.
29. See generallyWilliam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products
Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended Revolution in Product
Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2193 (1989); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1919, 1934 (2010); CHRISTOPHER HODGES, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PRODUCT
SAFETY 27–37 (2005); Lee, supra note 9, at 346 (ìThe issue of collective production is another way of
thinking about collective interests.ê); Joshua A. T. Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401 (2009); Hans–W. Micklitz, Liability for
Defective Products and Services, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW 242 (Norbert Reich et al. eds., 2d ed.
2014).
30. See generally Hans–W. Micklitz, Unfair Commercial Practices and Misleading Advertising, in
EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW 70 (Norbert Reich et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014); see also Cafaggi & Micklitz,
10
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collective interests similar to that of pollution (or product) victims. If the latter type
of interest derives its collective nature from the uniqueness of the pollutant event
(or the injury caused by a given product), the former type similarly derives its nature
from the similarity of legal activities such as unfair competitive practices or
breaches of contractual clauses.
C. Collective Interests and Collective Subjects
The problem with collective interests is that, in civil law countries, they are
embedded within a tradition of individual subjectivity. Under traditional rules of
civil procedure, the grounds supporting either a plaintiffs claim for relief or a
defendants opposition to a complaint only include individual rights, such as
property or contractual rights, that are clearly established by law. This does not
permit a single member of the group to bring suits on behalf of the group, even if
the bar means leaving collective interests without any form of legal protection.
Instead, in all cases involving collective interests, the civil law tradition tends to
characterize the plaintiff as an individual subject. In other words, the initial step
toward a solution is to recognize that the plaintiff should be reconstituted around
the ideal of a collective subject. If stakeholders are not entitled to promote judicial
protection of a given collective interest individually or derivatively,31 a specific
collective subject can achieve judicial goals that would otherwise be unattainable.
In any case, this focus on collective subjects should not be viewed as minimizing
the importance of collective interests because it simply reflects the traditional civil
law approach to judicial protection of substantive interests.
Subjects like labor unions, environmental organizations, and consumer
organizations were the principle mediums that allowed the Italian legal system to
include the paradigm of collective subjects within the protection of collective
interests. Such collective subjects are legally entitled to represent collective issues
before the courts. Thus, factors such as limited economic resources of
stakeholders32 and their informational or experiential weaknesses33 are overcome
through the creation of subjects economically and socially stronger than single
stakeholders. Indeed, unions and organizations are characterized by complex
structures, significant resources, and stable knowledge and familiarity with the
events surrounding a given collective interest. Yet, even though unions and
supra note 20, at 393 (noting that ìin Europe collective litigation has . . . affected some aspects of contract
law and unfair competition.ê).
31. See infra Section III(B).
32. For an analysis of the impact of economic resources on contract law, see Richard A. Posner, The
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX L. REV. 1581 (2005); see also Reich &Micklitz,
supra note 4, at 46, 48 (noting that the European approach to consumer concepts tends to include
situations in which the consumer ìrun[s] the risk of being isolated from social and economic life, be it
by over–indebtedness, illness or a lack of possibilities to communicateê and situations in which the
consumer is viewed as ìweaker partyê to a contract (emphasis and footnote omitted)).
33. See Archibald Cox, Strikes, Picketing, and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 588 (1951)
(ìEmployees have no bargaining power as a group unless they can withhold their labor as a group.ê);
Reich & Micklitz, supra note 4, at 23 (emphasizing the ì(collective) restrictions of the flow of
information against consumers, for example by standard business conditions which are not materially
justified.ê (emphasis omitted)). For a useful illustration of the approach of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (ìECJê), see generally Case C–309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse
Orde van Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I–1577, at para. 120; Case C–438/08, Intl Transp. Fedn & Finnish
Seamen Union v. Viking, 2007 ECR I–10779.
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organizations represented a break from the past, their capacity to protect collective
interests long remained consistent with the civil law tradition of individual
subjectivity.
In the Italian legal system, the formal move toward the protection of collective
interests through collective subjects occurred in 1970. Legislators recognized that
violations of crucial workers rights (i.e., the right to organize, bargain collectively,
and strike) were worthy of judicial protection through the claims of a labor union.34
Similarly, in 1986, Italian law authorized certain national associations for
environmental protection to intervene in proceedings to uphold a suit the Italian
Department for the Environment brought against the polluter.35 Later, the Italian
legislature considered consumer organizations well–suited to bring damages suits
or seek interim orders against unfair trade practices or abusive contractual clauses
even where consumers did not intend to pursue any course of action for the
individual harms caused by careless or wrongful conduct.36 Such rules are
confirmed and reinforced in todays legal framework. In particular, the salience of
these rules is bolstered by their connection with the legal protection that European
Union (ìE.U.ê) law afforded to collective interests.
The Italian legal debate undoubtedly relied on E.U. law throughout the years it
spent developing the Italian Consumer Code of 2005 (ìConsumer Codeê).37 The
European community has significantly devoted its attention to the role of collective
interests in advancing the protection of consumer interests. For example, since
1984, European law has recognized the importance of ìprotect[ing] consumers,
persons carrying on a trade or business or practising [sic] a craft or profession and
the interests of the public in general against misleading advertising and the unfair
consequences thereof.ê38 Some ten years later, the same type of approach applied
to the legal protection of consumers against ìunfair terms in contracts concluded
between a seller or supplier and a consumer.ê39
The E.U.s reinforcement of collective interests influenced all branches of
Italys national government through normative adaptation. The existing legal
principles of the Italian consumer law represent, in large part, many applications of
the corresponding E.U. law.40 For example, the provisions of the Consumer Code
34. See L. 20 maggio 1970, n. 300 art. 28(1) (It.) (Italian Workers Statute of 1970, Pub. L. No. 300,
art. 28(1)) (amended 1977 and 1990).
35. See L. 8 luglio 1986, n. 349 arts. 13–e 18(1) (It.) (Italian Law of 1986, Pub. L. No. 349, arts. 13
and 18(1), (5)) (concerning the institution of the Italian Environment Minister and environmental
damages); see also Parker, supra note 2, at 288–95. Cf. Italian Environmental Code of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 152 (It.).
36. See D.P.R. 24 maggio 1988, n. 244 (It.) (Italian Law of 1988, Pub. L. No. 224) (concerning the
liability for damages caused by defective products); D.P.R. 3 novembre 1998, n. 58 (It.) (Italian Law of
1998, Pub. L. No. 58) (concerning financial intermediation activities).
37. See Codice del Consumo 2005, Pub. L. No. 206 (It.) [hereinafter Consumer Code] (note the
Consumer Code has been amended several times). See Giacomo Pailli & Cristina Poncibò, In Search of
an Effective Enforcement of Consumer Rights: The Italian Case, in ENFORCEMENTAND EFFECTIVENESS
OF CONSUMER LAW 349 (Hans–W. Micklitz & Geneviève Saumier eds., 2018).
38. Directive No. 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 on misleading advertising, Pub. L. No. 250/17,
art. 1 (It.).
39. See Directive No. 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Pub. L. No.
95/29, art. 1(1) (It.).
40. See generally Reich & Michlitz, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that the Treaty on European Union
ìlists the internal market and consumer protection as areas of èshared competence between the Union
and the Members States.ê). For a useful illustration of the European harmonization of consumer legal
protection, see id. at 40 (noting that the approach to harmonization has followed certain policy changes
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governing commercial advertising and consumer information policy in Italy derive
their particular content from the general norms of E.U. law.41 The same is true of
many other legal rules, such as those that protect fair terms of contracts with
consumers or fair business–to–consumer commercial practices.42 A central feature
of the E.U.s approach is the protection of consumer interests through organizations
and representative subjects. While litigation could impose relevant costs on
individual stakeholders, organizations can effectively mitigate such costs and the
risk of unfavorable judicial decisions. The most important effect of empowering a
consumer organization to protect collective interests is that judicial decisions
become crucial to individual consumers even if the judge is asked to decide a case
involving a consumer organization. It might be the case that consumers are best
served, for example, by a representative lawsuit aimed at prohibiting unfair
commercial practices or invalidating unfair terms of standard contracts. This fact
emphasizes the vision of consumer organizations and other representative subjects
as an instrument for achieving wide–ranging objectives,43 moving beyond the
interests of a given organization to protect the collective interest of consumers.
III. REPRESENTATIVEACTIONS: THEAMERICAN
AND EUROPEAN LEGAL EXPERIENCE
While individual subjectivity plays a significant role in judicial protection of
substantive rights,44 a general opinion in the European legal debate is that
representative subjects are able to promote collective interestsîthat is, the diffuse
over time, ranging from ìcertain minimum standardsê to ìthe principle of complete or full
harmonizationê); Stuyck, supra note 4, at 70, 74; Hannes Unberath & Angus Johnston, The Doubleæ
Headed Approach of the ECJ Concerning Consumer Protection, 44 CML REV. 1237, 1257–81 (2007).
41. Cf. Directive No. 84/450/EEC, supra note 38, art. 4(1) (repealed in 2006) (It.) (providing that
Member States shall authorize ìpersons or organizations regarded under national law as having a
legitimate interest in prohibiting misleading advertising [to]: (a) take legal action against such
advertising; and/or (b) bring such advertising before an administrative authority competent either to
decide on complaints or to initiate appropriate legal proceedings.ê). Cf. now Directive No. 2006/114/EC
of 12 December 2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising, Pub. L. No. 376/21, art. 5(1)
(It.). Cf. Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 27(2). See also Micklitz, supra note 30, at 97.
42. Cf. Directive No. 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, supra note 39, art. 7(2) (providing that Member
States shall authorize ìpersons or organizations, having a legitimate interest under national law in
protecting consumers, [to] take action according to the national law concerned before the courts or before
competent administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual terms drawn up for general use
are unfair, so that they can apply appropriate and effective means to prevent the continued use of such
terms.ê); cf. Consumer Code, supra note 37, arts. 37(1), 66(1). See also Case C–240/98 to 244/98,
Océano Grupo Editorial v. Rocio Murciano Quintero, 2000 ERC I–4941, at para. 27 (stating that, under
E.U. law, Member States were called upon ìto implement adequate and effective means to prevent the
continued use of unfair terms, [and to pay careful attention to the fact that] those means [we]re to include
allowing authorised consumer associations to take action in order to obtain a decision as to whether
contractual terms drawn up for general use are unfair and, if need be, to have them prohibited, even if
they have not been used in specific contracts.ê); Case, C–372/99, Commission of the European
Communities v. Italian Republic, 2002 ERC I–819, at para. 14.
43. For an illustration of the difference between individual and collective disputes, see Richard A.
Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149,
178 (2003).
44. See CAPPELLETTI&PERILLO, supra note 2, at 42; Rowe, supra note 2, at 159; Parker, supra note
2, at 280; Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 2, at 264.
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and common interests of a group45îbut are subject to serious limitations or
challenges. First, the existence of representative subjects depends on the initiative
of stakeholders. The formation of representative entities can be a complex and
daunting procedure.46 A number of stakeholders must come together around their
common ground; for example, by agreeing that their common interest in
environmental conservation should be enhanced and protected. Stakeholders must
also invest some resources to craft an appropriate governance structure and provide
legal capital.
Second, organizations are usually entitled to protect collective interests within
a constraining framework of legal remedies. National legislatures of a large number
of European countries intended to provide legal protection of collective interests
through the framework of E.U. law. These legislatures essentially provided
substantive remedies for unfair practices involving certain groups of stakeholders
(i.e., consumers or users). Such remedies were, and still are, limited. As such, they
are relevant as a safeguard of stakeholders expectations only because they provide
a means of preventing the future use of unfair practices.47 By contrast, the limited
capacity of those remedies to secure compensatory relief or the reversal of unjust
enrichment reduces the role of representative entities. What organizations can do
under existing European legal rules is only promote a form of legal protection that
could be described as prospective and indirect.48 This system serves collective
interests by ensuring that those stakeholders who are harmed by a given unfair
practice enjoy the benefit of judicial elimination of the consequences of such a
practice.49 Moreover, because unfair practices are commonly repeated over time,
the European system of protection also forbids such practices in the future,50
45. See Griffin, supra note 11, at 161; Newman, supra note 1, at 131. For the analysis of consumer
right to association within the European legal system, see Reich & Micklits, supra note 4, at 27.
46. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 18, at 911.
47. Cf. Directive No. 98/27/EC of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers
interests, Pub. L. No. 166/51, art. 2(1)(a) (repealed in 2009) (It.) (requiring a legislative harmonization
in order to facilitate the judicial ìcessation or prohibition of any infringementê against the collective
interests of consumers). Cf. now Directive No. 2009/22/EC of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the
protection of consumers interests, Pub. L. No. 110/30, art. 2(1)(a) (It.); Consumer Code, supra note 37,
art. 140(1). See also Cafaggi & Micklitz, supra note 20, at 407 (noting that ìjudicial enforcement in
Europe employs remedies to prevent firms from introducing or selling unsafe products or unsafe or
improper services, and to force firms to remove them if they are already on the market.ê); Norbert Reich,
Legal Protection of Individual and Collective Consumer Interests, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW 378
(Norbert Reich et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014).
48. See generally Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans–W. Micklitz, Introduction, in NEW FRONTIERS OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 2 (Norbert
Reich et al. eds., 2d ed. 2014) (ìAn integrated strategy to combine remedies to deter and remedies to
compensate is . . . needed.ê).
49. Cf. Directive No. 93/13/EEC, supra note 39, art. 7(2)–(3) (authorizing courts and administrative
bodies to apply, under national law, ìappropriate and effective means to prevent the continued use of
[unfair] terms . . . against a number of sellers or suppliers from the same economic sector or their
associations which use or recommend the use of the same general contractual terms or similar terms.ê);
Consumer Code, supra note 37, arts. 37(1), 66(1), 140(1). See also Cafaggi & Micklitz, supra note 20,
at 408 (ìIn . . . areas, such as unfair contract terms and deceptive advertisements, injunctions may have
both functions: to cause unlawful conduct to cease, and to take corrective action.ê); Hans–W. Micklitz,
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, in EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW 127 (Norbert Reich et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2014).
50. See Directive No. 93/13/EEC, supra note 39, art. 7(2)–(3).
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imposing the payment of compensation for breaches of that duty, thereby
discouraging wrongdoers from using such practices in future cases.51
A. The Role of European Union Law: From
Preventive Measures to Compensation
These limitations have significantly reduced the impact of consumer protection
over a long period of time. They suggest that while organizations can impede
wrongdoers from repeating their illegal conduct, they cannot require payments to
compensate stakeholders for the damage to their collective interests. Under E.U.
law, the relationship between judicial protection and individual subjectivity has
impeded organizations and other representative entities from bringing a lawsuit for
individual money damages against the wrongdoer (serving the wrongdoer with a
request through the court that seeks a compensation order to be paid to stakeholders
directly).52 The right to individual compensation exceeds the ability of
organizations, which are entitled to protect collective interests through a judicial
preclusion of future unfair practices and serve a given collective interest only by
preserving it in the future and minimizing risks from new deceptive activities.53
51. See Issacharoff & Samuel, supra note 23, at 50 (stating that the European consumer protection
ìcan either try to anticipate the likely sources of harm and either prohibit certain forms of conduct or
prescribe the precautionary steps necessary for avoidance of harm.ê); Reich, supra note 47, at 381.
52. It is worth reiterating that E.U. law does not pose formal obstacles to representative litigation.
European legal provisions require that Member States warrant judicial or administrative protection of
consumers and users through the claims of ìpersons or organizations.ê See Directive No. 84/450/EEC,
supra note 41, art. 4(1); Directive No. 2006/114/EC, supra note 41, art. 5(1); Directive No. 93/13/EEC,
supra note 39, art. 7(2); Directive No. 2009/22/EC of 23 April 2009, supra note 47, arts. 2, 3. According
to E.U. law, the judicial protection of consumers and users depends on the choices of national legislators
and is generally viewed as a set of preventive and injunctive measures aimed at impeding future
reiterations of unfair practices or unjust contractual terms. Both individual stakeholders and
organizations may avail themselves of such measures to protect their own interests or the interests of
represented stakeholders. By contrast, Member States do not authorize organizations to bring damages
lawsuits on behalf of individual stakeholders over a long period of time. This approach to the protection
of consumers and users has significantly changed over time as the European legal system has introduced
representative and class actions. These measures have afforded individual compensatory remedies
against the wrongdoer, regardless of whether the lawsuit has been brought by an individual stakeholder
or an organization. The E.U. Parliament and E.U. Council recently presented a Proposal of Directive on
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, 2018/0089/COD
[hereinafter Proposal], available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/procedure/EN/2018_89. The Proposal
authorizes Member States to ìensure that representative actions can be brought before national courts or
administrative authorities by qualified entities.ê The Proposal defines the scope of representative actions
in a targeted fashion. It includes not only those types of request for the court that seeks ìan injunction
order . . . for stopping . . . [or] prohibiting the practiceê or ìestablishing that the practice constitutes an
infringement of law,ê but also those types of request for the court that seeks ìa redress order, which
obligates the trader to provide for, inter alia, compensation, repair, replacement, price reduction,
contract termination or reimbursement of the price paidê (emphasis added). See Proposal, arts. 5, 6.
The Proposal demonstrates the active role for Member States in promoting the protection of consumer
interests through representative litigation. Over the past two decades, representative mechanisms have
been introduced into some European legal systems, allowing Member States to anticipate the E.U. law.
See, e.g., HODGES, supra note 6, at 9–49.
53. See Issacharoff & Samuel, supra note 23, at 50; Cafaggi & Micklitz, supra note 20, at 408 (ìWhen
courts are asked to issue injunctive relief, they are dealing with measures aimed at affecting the
likelihood of future harm, together with the removal of harmful effects that have already occurred.ê);
Reich, supra note 47, at 381.
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Under E.U. law and many other European legal systems, organizations are not
authorized to require compensation on behalf of stakeholders.54 From the
beginning, E.U. law exerted strong influence on national legal backdrops within the
E.U.55 Even if civil law countries56 are influenced by the legal framework of the
E.U., the legal rule by which organizations were prohibited from requiring
compensation on behalf of stakeholders was always depicted as a core feature of
the civil law tradition. Such a limitation reflects a view firmly embedded within the
ancient civil law tradition that individuals and organizations can promote only the
judicial protection of their individual interests.57 Thus, what initially appears to be
an adjustment to E.U. law reveals itself as something different under proper
analysis: the respect that E.U. law accords to the civil law tradition.58 Among other
things, the civil law approach imposes a strict relationship between rights and legal
interests on the one hand and judicial protection on the other. Therefore, changes
in E.U. law and the core principles of civil law tradition inevitably go hand in hand,
embedded within each other.59
To summarize the most relevant points discussed above with respect to the
recent evolution of European legal systems:
i. The European legal changes adopted a capacious view of the
judicial protection of consumers and users, focusing attention
on their collective interests.60
ii. This broad view nevertheless remained rigorously consistent
with the idea of individual subjectivity as a requirement of
judicial protection, so only those organizations that represented
the common interests of a given group of people were entitled
to promote judicial protection of the groups collective
interests.
54. For the Italian legal system, see Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140(1). Under this legal
provision, those associations of consumers and users that are legally registered are entitled to protect the
collective interests of consumers or users at large. They can bring a request to the court that seeks an
injunctive order against unfair practices and their detrimental effects. For the German legal system, see
German Federal Nature Conservation Act, Dec. 20, 1976, BGBL. I S. 3573, § 64 (Ger.); German Act on
Injunctive Relief, Nov. 29, 2001, BGBL. I S. 3138, § 1 (Ger.); German Act against Unfair Competition,
Mar. 3, 2010, BGBL. I S. 254, § 8 (Ger.).
55. See, e.g., Reich & Micklitz, supra note 4, at 7; Unberath & Johnston, supra note 40, at 1257.
56. Most European countries are civil law countries. Mary Ann Glendon, Civil Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-law-Romano-Germanic/Succession-and-gifts (last
visited Jan. 11, 2020).
57. See, e.g., HODGES, supra note 6, at 88; THORSON, supra note 6, at 89; Eilmansberger, supra note
6, at 1203.
58. See, e.g., CAPPELLETTI, supra note 7, at 268.
59. SeeCafaggi &Micklitz, supra note 20, at 405 (ìIndividual judicial enforcement has always played
a strong role, as the [European Court of Justice] instrumentalized private individuals to foster the
European integration process by granting individual rights and even particular remedies.ê).
60. See Unberath & Johnston, supra note 40, at 1255 (arguing that ìthe very nature of consumer
èprotection . . . [is] normally limited to correction of market failures. Hence, if consumer–protective
laws are uniform then the consumer knows about his rights of redress in relation to market deficiencies.
In a èhealthy market environment the consumer may not need such extra protection and, consequently,
laws on consumer protection may impose extra costs without in fact improving the position of
consumers.ê); Reich & Micklits, supra note 4, at 11 (ìConsumer protection has . . . gained autonomous
importance within the system of legal protection under Community law and legitimises both measures
taken by Member States and the Community.ê).
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iii. The central reason for asserting this limited extension was the
correlation of collective interests among stakeholders as a
group that reflected the stable core of judicial protection under
the civil law tradition. While stakeholders can individually
promote judicial protection of their own individual interests,
they are not entitled to bring individual lawsuits in order to
protect the collective interest even if both individual interests
and the collective interest manifest themselves within the same
case.
iv. Organizations and other representative subjects were entitled to
bring lawsuits on behalf of stakeholders only when they sought
injunctive measures against unfair practices by the wrongdoer.
Even if individual expectations usually reflect the broader view
of consumers about their legal protection, redress orders were
viewed as inapposite to the mechanism of representative
litigation.
Though the legal framework summarized here remained in force over a long
period of time, it eventually was found to be unsustainable. Specifically, the
absence of any representative lawsuits resulted in a strong limitation on private
damages actions against violations of collective interests. Both individual lawsuits
against the wrongdoer to impede future unfair practices and individual damages
lawsuits against violations involving individual interests proved to be economically
burdensome and, in many cases, altogether unbearable. Even if organizations are
authorized to bring lawsuits to prevent future unfair practices, they are not entitled
to promote damages actions on behalf of stakeholders. As a result, the civil law
tradition offered an incomplete solution to the problem of compensation; it only
permitted individual stakeholders to bring individual damages suits against the
wrongdoer in national courts. In other words, it authorized only lawsuits for
individual damages in light of the underlying rationale on which the judicial
protection of rights is based in the civil law tradition. Furthermore, it did so at the
expense of increasing the possibility of situations in which collective interests can
be undermined and leave group members without compensation.
The evolution of the European legal system demonstrates that such situations
are not solely the product of stakeholders often limited financial means, they are
also the result of legal limitations. Individual stakeholders can expend their limited
economic resources to bring individual damages lawsuits, but individual resources
are insufficient to promote judicial protection of collective interests.61 Within the
civil law system, no substantive right is beyond individual subjectivity, and the
legislatures consistently limit the forms of judicial protection that can be promoted
on behalf of stakeholders.
61. See Cappelletti, supra note 10, at 660.
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B. The American and European Legal Experience:
From Derivative to Class Actions
The legislatures of many European countries anticipated the E.U. would make
changes to representative litigation. In the event of legal inadequacy, it is
incumbent upon legal systems to overcome their traditional approach or, at the very
least, adjust it to take new, pragmatic considerations into account. National
legislators were urged to reduce limitations on representative disputes by
stakeholders who found such limitations unacceptable. For example, the Italian
Civil Code (ìCivil Codeê)62 was amended in 2003 to authorize derivative lawsuits
to obtain damages on behalf of a corporation against directors who are alleged to
have breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation itself.63 Until driven to do
so by the need to protect minority shareholders, Italian legislators never attempted
to increase judicial protection of corporations through the possibility of derivative
actions aimed at compensating damages suffered by the corporation. The initial
skepticism towards derivative actions resulted in reduced protection of corporate
interests. Controlling shareholders are not inclined to bring damages lawsuits
against the board of directors because corporations boards are often comprised of
a selection of the controlling shareholders.64
Such a derivative action must be properly viewed as reinforcing the protection
afforded to Italian corporations through legal remedies. Before it was amended in
2003, the Civil Code provided for derivative actions. This type of action was not
aimed at compensating damages, but it allowed minority shareholders to sue in a
corporations name in order to obtain a judicial replacement of the board of directors
following relevant breaches of their fiduciary duties.65 This legal remedy is still in
force and provides another useful illustration of the traditional civil law approach
to representative litigations: an approach that allows the representative party to sue
in the form of derivative action only where the judicial protection afforded to
stakeholders does not directly affect their individual interests and rights. Instead,
where derivative actions provide a suitable vehicle for assuring individual rights
(such as rights to damage awards), they are not accepted as an integral part of the
legal system. A comparable approach is visible when legal rules authorize
organizations or other representative entities to bring derivative lawsuits in order to
preclude future unfair practices. Even this type of remedy shows itself as so unfit
to directly affect the individual rights of stakeholders that civil law systems allow
organizations to bring lawsuits on behalf of stakeholders. To the contrary, damages
lawsuits are forbidden by civil law systems as derivative actions because they are
intended to assure individual rights. Once again, this selective approach is
62. See Codice civile, marzo 16, 1942, n.262 G.U. Ap. 4, 1942, n.79 (It.) (Italian Civil Code of 1942,
Publ. L. No. 262) [hereinafter Civil Code].
63. See Civil Code, supra note 62, art. 2393–bis. This legal provision, art. 2393–bis., has been
translated in English and reprinted in ITALIAN COMPANY LAW (Valerio Piacentini ed., 2014) [hereinafter
Abstract of the Civil Code].
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. For a recent analysis of derivative actions within the pattern of
entrepreneurial litigation, see generally JOHNC. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE,
FALL, AND FUTURE 33 (2015).
65. See Civil Code, supra note 62, art. 2409 (translated and reprinted in Abstract of the Civil Code,
supra note 63, art. 2409).
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consistent with the principle of individual subjectivity that characterizes litigation
within the civil law tradition as unrepresentative.
In the years since the Consumer Code was enacted,66 the Italian legislature has
been forced to ponder a new question: must a modern legal system make a
commitment to reforms in order to increase the judicial protection of individual and
collective interests through derivative actions or class actions?67 If increasing the
possibility of bringing derivative actions did not represent a dramatic legal change,
integrating the paradigm of class actions into civil law tradition was problematic for
many reasons. In short, when class actions are viewed through the lens of American
law (the traditional model of class actions),68 they appear inconsistent with bedrock
principles founded in the civil law tradition. There is not only the problem of
bringing a lawsuit on behalf of a class,69 but there is also the question of whether or
not class members must opt to participate in the lawsuit brought by the class
representative.
It is well–known that in the American legal system, class actions proceed on
an opt–out basis.70 To opt out is to declare that he or she, a potential class member,
will not be bound by any judgment. While the opt–out procedure implies the
automatic involvement of all class members in the binding effects of judicial
decision,71 the complex regulatory system based upon Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (ìFRCPê) 23 distinguishes situations where ìthe court may direct
appropriate notice to the classê72 once the class action is certified from situations
where ìthe court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable
under the circumstances.ê73 The distinction implies that in ìmayê situations, the
66. See Consumer Code, supra note 37.
67. See, e.g., Jolowicz, supra note 1, at 233 (noting that ìthe action brought by a representative of a
group or class of persons would appear on its face to provide the most obvious procedural technique for
the protection of the rights or interests of the group or class.ê).
68. Even though the origins of class action are deeply rooted in English law, the American tradition
has engendered the most relevant and practiced model of class–wide litigation. See, e.g., Zechariah Jr.
Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1932); YEAZELL, supra note 20;
Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in Collective Litigation,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687 (1997); Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems:
Variations and Alternatives to American Actions, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 401 (2002); RACHAEL
MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 9
(2004). See also JACK H. FRIEDHENTAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES ANDMATERIALS 753 (12th
ed. 2018) (ìFor many years the class action was viewed as a uniquely American device, unlikely to take
root abroad. However, forms of collective action increasingly are being adopted outside of the United
States, influenced by, but not fully embracing, the American form.ê).
69. David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913
(1998).
70. See generally BARBARA ALLAN BABCOCK ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS
1035 (5th ed. 2013); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 709 (5th ed. 2015); LINDA J.
SILBERMAN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 968 (5th ed. 2017); JOANNA C.
SCHWARTZ & STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 829 (10th ed. 2018). There are notable
exceptions in which the driving concern is protecting class members in light of their individual
expectations.
71. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 290 F.3d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 2002) (ìThe
point of allowing opt outs is to separate the claims of class members from those of others. If parties that
have opted out could be dragged back in under the supplemental jurisdiction, a core function of Rule
23(b) would be nullified.ê); Sperling v. Hoffmann–La Roche, Inc., 24 F.3d 463, 470 (3d Cir. 1994)
(ìMembers of a Rule 23(b)(3) class are automatically included and remain so unless they make a timely
election to opt–out.ê).
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(A) (emphasis added); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2).
73. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(B) (emphasis added); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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judgment ìinclude[s] . . . those whom [the] court finds to be class membersê74 even
when the court has chosen to avoid any notice to the class, while in the ìmustê
situations, the judgment ìinclude[s] . . . those to whom the . . . notice was
[necessarily] directed.ê75 The focus on the use of notice has implications for the
role played by the opt–out mechanism. Because FRCP 23(c)(2)(A) merely
authorizes the court to order notice to the class that has been certified under FRCP
23(b)(1) or (2),76 it provides little room for the opt–out mechanism to operate.77 It
allows class members to opt out of the class ìon a selective basis,ê78 meaning only
when the court has deemed it appropriate to ensure them the possibility of individual
exclusion.
To the contrary, when the class is certified under FRCP 23(b)(3),79 the court is
required to order notice to all members so that they are individually entitled to opt
out of the class whenever the class action has been certified. The underlying
principle, which coheres with the representative nature of class actions, is that class
litigation rigorously proceeds on an opt–out basis only when it is an aggregation of
many individual claims that revolve predominantly around some common questions
of law or fact. Conversely, when the class action becomes a mechanism for
preventing impairments of non–class interests under FRCP 23(b)(1) or seeking final
injunctive or declaratory relief under FRCP 23(b)(2), the right to opt out of the class
depends on the cautious deliberation of the court.80 In particular, the court is to
allow class members to opt out when the binding effect of the class action on that
member would be more detrimental than the costs of notice under FRCP
23(c)(2)(A).
This legal framework is informed by matters of individual behavior, economic
analysis, and judicial efficiency. For jurists and commentators who view class
litigation as promoting generalized solutions, the opt–out mechanism is the
appropriate rule to govern collective cases without going further by issuing several
similar decisions or imposing costs and risks on the class members.81 On the one
hand, the opt–out basis prevents procedural disturbances because issues such as the
legitimacy of class members or their membership to the class cannot arise and pose
obstacles to judicial decision.82 On the other hand, the opt–outmechanism increases
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(A).
75. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(B).
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)–(2). Rule 23(b)(1) allows the court to certify the class action when
it alternatively recognizes that (i) the class opponent would otherwise be at risk of being subjected to
incompatible duties or (ii) class members who would not be parties to the individual litigation could
produce injustice as a practical matter. Rule 23(b)(2) allows the court to certify the class action when
(i) the class shares a general claim against the party opposing the class and (ii) the class seeks either final
injunctive or declaratory relief. Id.
77. Cf. Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2008) (ìMembers of a Rule 23(b)(2) class do
not receive notice and cant opt out.ê).
78. Cf. Eubank v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) allows the court to certify the class action when it
recognizes that (i) the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over individual
interests and (ii) the certification of class action reveals itself as the best way to process the case. Id.
80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(A) (providing that ìthe court may direct appropriate notice to the class.ê
(emphasis added)).
81. See Dodson, supra note 22, at 173 (ìIn an èopt–out class, any person within the scope of the class
definition is a class member by default unless she affirmatively excludes herself from the class and
preserves her right to litigate individually.ê).
82. SeeMiller, supra note 15, at 666 (ìEven if the negative effects of class actions were assumed, they
would have to be balanced against the societal benefits derived from deterring socially proscribed
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the efficiency of the legal system by reducing costs of litigation because the benefits
of ìaggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveriesê83 outweigh the costs of
the representative nature of the proceedings.84 In other words, the fact that class
members do not directly participate in the proceedings (i.e., they are not entitled to
the production of documents) can be accepted to avoid the costs of repeating ìissues
from trial to trialê85 because requirements such as numerosity,86 commonality,87 and
typicality88 warrant a generalizable solution for all class members.89
conduct and providing small claim rectificationîconsiderations that thus far have escaped measurement
and perhaps always will.ê); Tobias BarringtonWolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 717, 785 (2005) (ìWhen offered as a means of addressing potential sources of unfairness to class
members in an ongoing proceeding, notice and opt out operate on the presumption that absentees will
read the contents of a notification and possess the capacity to make a meaningful decision about how
best to protect their own interests.ê); FRIEDHENTAL ET AL., supra note 68, at 753 (arguing that ìthe
[class] procedure aggregates claims and defenses that the named representative and class members share
in common, but which any individual litigant alone might not be able to pursue because of the expense
and inconvenience of litigation.ê).
83. See Amchem Products, Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)).
84. See FRIEDHENTAL ET AL., supra note 68, at 753.
85. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986).
86. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). See also Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or
Representational Device, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459, 475–76 (1983); Cent. States Southeast & Southwest
Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck–Medco Managed Care, LLC, 504 F.3d 229, 244–45 (2d Cir.
2007) (ìThe numerosity requirement . . . does not mandate that joinder of all parties be impossible–only
that the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all members of the class make use of the class action
appropriate.ê); Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999) (ìAlthough
the number of members in a proposed class is not determinative of whether joinder is impracticable . . .
the size of the class in this caseî100 to 150 membersîis within the range that generally satisfies the
numerosity requirement.ê); Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993) (ìImpracticable does
not mean impossible.ê).
87. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). See also Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 227 (3d Cir. 2001)
(commonality can be satisfied when at least one question of fact or law ìis common to each member of
[the] class.ê); Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 868 (9th Cir. 2001) (ì[I]n a civil–rights suit . . .
commonality is satisfied where the lawsuit challenges a system–wide practice or policy that affects all
of the putative class members. . . . In such circumstance, individual factual differences among the
individual litigants or groups of litigants will not preclude a finding of commonality.ê); Mullen, 186 F.3d
at 625 (ìThe test for commonality is not demanding and is met èwhere there is at least one issue, the
resolution of which will affect all or a significant number of the putative class members.ê (quoting
Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1997))); Baby Neal for and by Kanter v.
Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that while ì[t]he concepts of commonality and typicality
are broadly defined and tend to merge, . . . neither of these requirements mandates that all putative class
members share identical claims . . . [so that] factual differences among the claims of the putative class
members do not defeat certification.ê).
88. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). See also Rector v. City and County of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 950
(10th Cir. 2003) (ìBy definition, class representatives who do not have Article III standing to pursue the
class claims fail to meet the typicality requirements of Rule 23.ê); Lightbourn v. County of El Paso,
Tex., 118 F.3d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1997) (ìTypicality focuses on the similarity between the named
plaintiffs legal and remedial theories and the legal and remedial theories of those whom they purport to
represent.ê); Schachner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ohio, 77 F.3d 889, 896 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the claimer ìwho can assert only federal . . . claims, would be unable to adequately represent a class
which includes state law claimants, because his claims would not be typical of theirs, as Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a)(3) requires.ê); Paxton v. Union Nat. Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 561 (8th Cir. 1982) (ìThe
rule does not require that every question of law or fact be common to every member of the class . . . and
may be satisfied, for example, èwhere the question of law linking the class members is substantially
related to the resolution of the litigation even though the individuals are not identically situated.ê
(quoting American Finance Sys., Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94, 107 (D.Md. 1974))).
89. See WalæMart, 564 U.S. at 338; Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2245 (1997)
(ìRule 23(a) states four threshold requirements applicable to all class actions: (1) numerosity (a èclass
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The question thus arises of how civil law systems can balance the economic
and procedural advantages of the opt–out mechanism against the legal restrictions
on representative actions. The ideal of individual subjectivity pervades the
relationship between substantial rights and judicial protection. Treating class
actions as a means of judicial protection for absent parties is inconsistent with
procedural systems that forbid representative actions, albeit with some notable
exceptions.90 Under the opt–out mechanism, the class judgment exerts binding
force on all class members, including the proponents of class action; the judicial
decision is binding even upon those who will never become party to the class
litigation or exercise their procedural rights to protect their substantive interests.91
For these reasons, in the years following the first foray of the E.U. into
representative litigation,92 some European countries introduced a revolutionary
legal change. The most basic regulations are those in which national legislators
have authorized private damages lawsuits in the form of limited representative
actions, such as in France93 and Spain.94 This legal restriction implies that certain
consumer organizations are exclusively entitled to bring such lawsuits on behalf of
[so large] that joinder of all members is impracticable); (2) commonality (èquestions of law or fact
common to the class); (3) typicality (named parties claims or defenses èare typical . . . of the class);
and (4) adequacy of representation (representatives èwill fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class).ê); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 353 (1999) (emphasizing ìthe requirement that there be adequacy of
representation for absent class members before they may be bound to a proceeding in which they had no
individual ability to participate.ê).
90. For an illustration of the Italian legal system and its reluctance towards representative litigation,
see supra Section II(A); see also Civil Code, supra note 62, arts. 2393–bis, 2409.
91. Cf.Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40–41 (1940) (ìIt is a principle of general application in Anglo–
American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is
not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process. . . . To these
general rules there is a recognized exception that, to an extent not precisely defined by judicial opinion,
the judgment in a èclass or èrepresentative suit, to which some members of the class are parties, may
bind members of the class or those represented who were not made parties to it.ê); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) (ì[E]ach class member who can be identified through reasonable
effort must be notified that he may request exclusion from the action and thereby preserve his opportunity
to press his claim separately or that he may remain in the class and perhaps participate in the management
of the action.ê). For classes certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), a notification to the class is required
before the binding effect of class judgment may be exerted. Because Rule 23(c)(2) makes explicit that
the notification will specify that ìthe court will exclude from the class any member who request
exclusion,ê all class members are automatically bound by the class judgment, unless they decide to opt
out of the class. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v). Instead, the class members who do not opt out of
the class ìmay enter an appearance through an attorney if [they] so desire.ê See FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(2)(B)(iv).
92. See supra Section III(A).
93. See Loi n. 92–60, Jan. 18, 1992, arts. 524–1, 621–1, 621–2, 621–7 to 621–9 (French Consumer
Code of 1992, Pub. L. No. 92/60, arts. 524–1, 621–1, 621–2, 621–7 to 621–9) (Fr.) [hereinafter French
Law]; see also Sabine Bernheim–Desvaux & Patricia Foucher, L’effectivité du droit français de la
consommation, in ENFORCEMENTANDEFFECTIVENESSOFCONSUMERLAW 287, 295 (Hans–W.Micklitz
& Geneviève Saumier eds., 2018). For a comparative analysis, see Fisch, supra note 23, at 60.
94. See C.E., B.O.E. n. 51, Nov. 16, 2007 (Spanish Law of Consumers and Users Protection of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 1, art. 37(c)) (Spain) [hereinafter Spanish Law]; L.E. CIV. N. 1, Jan. 8, 2000, art. 11 (Spanish
Code of Civil Procedure of 2000, Pub. L. No. 1, art. 11) (Spain); L.O.P.J. n. 6 y 7(3), July 1, 1985
(Spanish Organic Law of the Judiciary of 1985, Pub. L. No. 6, art. 7(3)) (Spain). See also María Teresa
Alonso Pérez et al., An Interdisciplinary View of Enforcement and Effectiveness of Spanish Consumer
Law, in ENFORCEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSUMER LAW 591, 601 (Hans–W. Micklitz &
Geneviève Saumier eds., 2018) (ìNowadays, the most important proceedings before the courts in respect
of consumer law (financial products, unfair terms on loans for house purchase) have been channeled
through consumer associations.ê).
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individual consumers.95 In other cases, the legal approach to collective actions has
been more disruptive, leaving room for new considerations to move to the forefront.
For example, the German legal system suggests a broad understanding of
representative actions because it allows not only organizations, but also individual
stakeholders (investors) to bring damages lawsuits against unfair financial
information or breaches of duty to exactly perform securities contracts.96 This legal
backdrop is partly the product of financial scandals that involved a large number of
shareholders and investors.97 It also reflects the choice to empower the judicial
protection of individual rights by allowing a representative subject to bring a lawsuit
for money damages on behalf of a given group of stakeholders.98
While the new legal rules reflect a gradual development of legal principles in
civil law countries, they reveal themselves as a sort of legal middle ground in which
the active role of the group representative (the organization or the individual
stakeholder) is overcome by the persistence of certain traditional characteristics.
Recall the example of German law, which preserves the individual right of each
member of the group to bring individual damages lawsuits on the same factual
issues on which the claim of the group representative is already based.99 These
factual similarities authorize the aggregation and suspension of all individual cases
until the common issues are addressed by a superior court.100 The adjudication of
a representative dispute exerts binding force on related private damages lawsuits.
Thus, the German legal system is comprised largely of different elements that carry
neither a pure civil law model nor a pure common law model.101 The driving
concern is not with protecting stakeholders through a representative claim but,
rather, aggregating individual actions into a workable and integrated procedure.102
Similarly, English law has enacted a model of group litigation designed to
comply with the requirements of representative lawsuits as articulated in other
European countries. English law provides a special procedure used to guide the
concrete disputes that come before the courts when factual or legal similarities are
involved.103 Each stakeholder is entitled to bring an individual lawsuit, paying
95. See French Law, supra note 93, arts. 621–1, 621–2; Spanish Law, supra note 94, art. 37(c).
96. See German Capital Markets Model Case Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. BGBL. I S. 2437 (amended in
2012) (Ger.) [hereinafter German Law]; see also P. Gottwald, On the Extension of Collective Legal
Protection in German, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 484 (2007); H. Micklitz & A. Stadler, The Development of
Collective Legal Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure, 17 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1473
(2006); M. Bälz & F. Blobel, Collective Litigation German Style: The Act on the Model Proceedings in
Capital Market Disputes, in CONFLICTS OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 126 (E. Gottshalk et al.
eds., 2007).
97. SeeM. Stürner,Model Case Proceedings in the Capital Markets: Tentative Steps Toward Group
Litigation in Germany, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 250 (2007); see also THIJS BOSTERS, COLLECTIVE REDRESS
AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE E.U. 27–34 (2017) (noting that ì[t]o come to some sort of
resolution of (or at least a beginning of a solution to) the Deutsche Telekom case, the German legislator
came up with the Kapitalanleger Musterverfahrensgesetz [(Capital Markets Model Case Act)] . . . which
came into effect in 2005.ê). For a comparative analysis, see Fisch, supra note 23, at 71.
98. See BOSTERS, supra note 97, at 31–32.
99. See German Law, supra note 96, art. 1(2); see also Stürner, supra note 97, at 255.
100. See German Law, supra note 96, arts. 6(1), 7(1), 8(2); see also BOSTERS, supra note 97, at 31.
101. See Stürner, supra note 97, at 258.
102. Id.; see also BOSTERS, supra note 97, at 31 (arguing that the German Law ìcan partly be seen as
an opt–in system, as it will be accessible only when there is an adequate incentive for individual
claimants to file a lawsuit in the first place.ê).
103. See C.P.R. 19.10 (Group Litigation Orders) (Eng.). See generally I NEIL ANDREWS, ON CIVIL
PROCESSES: COURT PROCEEDINGS 642, 645 (2013) (noting that GLO procedure ìis founded on a simple
requirement: that there will be a co–ordinated and central listing of all related cases on a group register
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careful attention to the so–called ìgroup litigation orderê (ìGLOê),104 a judicial
pronouncement that provides the basis for managing all claims that ìgive rise to
common or related issues in fact or law.ê105 A GLO authorizes ìthe establishment
of a register on which the claims . . . will be entered.ê106 The centralized resolution
of common issues is binding on all individual claims entered on the group register,
thereby precluding all similar claims.107
Despite important differences pertaining to the mechanisms for aggregating
individual claims, both German and English law evidence substantial respect for
the civil law tradition. Absent a stakeholders choice to opt in108 and stand by the
centralized solution of common issues, those collective procedures lack any
effective means to give a generalizable and binding judicial decision on common
issues. Bringing a civil lawsuit is a way of exercising a substantive right.109 Therein
lies the true significance of the principle of individual subjectivity that informs the
civil law tradition: it leaves what is perhaps the most important principle for the
protection of substantive rights on procedural grounds. Judicial protection depends
on whether a plaintiff claims that the applicable law demands a certain substantive
outcome.110
The lynchpin of American representative litigation, as articulated in the context
of class action regulation,111 is that when a class action is decided, all class members
are bound by judgment.112 European legal systems, on the other hand, treat the
solution of common issues as the basis for deciding other similar cases.113 Thus,
. . . specify[ing] relevant issues.ê); see also Rachael Mulheron, Some Difficulties with Group Litigation
OrdersîAnd Why a Class Action is Superior, 24 C.J.Q. 40 (2005).
104. SeeC.P.R. 19.11 (Group Litigation Orders) (Eng.). See also Taylor v. Nugent Care Society [2004]
EWCA (Civ) 51 (Eng.) (explaining that the GLO system, which was introduced by an amendment to the
English Civil Procedure Rules in 2000, depended on ìthe experience of the courts that if litigation
involving a substantial number of claimants was to be managed in the appropriate way, it was essential
that there should be some procedure which provided the courts with very wide powers to manage the
proceedings.ê); Mulheron, supra note 103, at 53 (noting that GLO procedures ìhave no requirement
which would enable a court to make an order requiring a claimant to join a group action if the claimant
chose not to do so. A claimant is perfectly entitled to decide to bring an action without taking that step.
The fact that he has that right does not mean, however, that there are no good reasons why he should
join a GLO which covers issues which will be involved in his litigation.ê).
105. Id.; C.P.R. 19.10 (Group Litigation Orders) (Eng.). See also ANDREWS, supra note 103, at 646
(noting that ì[s]uch a ècommon issue will normally concern questions of liability or the availability of
a particular head of loss.ê).
106. See C.P.R. 19.11(2)(a) (Group Litigation Orders) (Eng.).
107. C.P.R. 19.12(1)(a) (Group Litigation Orders) (Eng.). Under Rule 19.12(1)(a), the judicial
determination on common issues is binding on the whole group ìunless the court orders otherwise.ê See
ANDREW, supra note 103, at 646 (noting that ìdecisions on ècommon issues are binding on, and in favor
of, the group.ê).
108. See ANDREWS, supra note 103, at 643 (ìThe GLO procedure is an opt–in system.ê); Mulheron,
supra note 103, at 47 (ì[T]he GLO schema is an opt–in regime.ê).
109. See CAPPELLETTI&PERILLO, supra note 2, at 42; Rowe, supra note 2, at 159; Parker, supra note
2, at 280; Cappalli & Consolo, supra note 2, at 264.
110. See supra Section II(A).
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
112. Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984) (ì[A] judgment in a properly
entertained class action is binding on class members in any subsequent litigation. . . . Basic principles of
res judicata (merger and bar or claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) apply.ê);
Wolff, supra note 82, at 763 (ìRule 23 is hedged about with elaborate protections aimed at ensuring that
the court will exercise th[e] authority [to multiply the binding effect of their proceedings] only to an
extent consistent with the interests of the absentees.ê).
113. See generally Rachael Mulheron, The United Kingdom’s New OptæOut Class Action, 37 OXF. J.
LEG. STUD. 814 (2017).
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the central distinction between the American and European approach is that the
former requires the consistent application of a given judicial decision within the
context of class members, and the latter does not. The conceptual terrain of the
American class action involves an interest all class members share in having their
substantial rights protected in the absence of any procedural choice. In other words,
class members are not called upon to show that they are entitled to relief. The
adjudication of a class–representative claim is sufficient to protect the legitimate
expectations of class membersîthose who live under ìthe same event or pattern or
practice and . . . the same legal theoryê114îon procedural grounds.115 The
irrelevance of class members lawsuits also provides a consistent explanation for
the opt–out mechanism that infuses the non–mandatory American class action116
with a general preference for control over the disruptive (and, as mentioned above,
often unbearable) costs of individual claims.117
Instead, European legal systems are grounded in a more formalistic reasoning.
Given the adjudication of a class–representative claim, bringing individual lawsuits
is necessary to legitimate its application, or the application of its legal reasoning on
common issues, to those who expressly consent to it. It is one thing to accept that
the solution of common issues exerts binding force on the adjudication of class
members claims, but it is quite another to conclude that when a representative case
is decided, the judicial reasoning must be considered as effective to protect the
expectations of all would–be class members. In cases where the representative
procedure requires class members to bring individual lawsuits against the
wrongdoer, judges are called upon to update their decisions in light of the solution
to common issues arising in the representative case.118 In doing so, judges will
invariably take into account the relevant facts of each individual case and stand by
the legal reasoning of previous decisions relevant to common issues
notwithstanding doubts about the merits of said decisions. Further, judges are asked
to combine prior legal reasoning with factual and legal contexts emerging from the
cases before them. The existence of individual lawsuits implies that judges decide
the disputes of class members on the assumption that the allegations align with the
claim of the class representative. The factual and legal distance between the claim
of the class representative and the claims of class members increases the probability
that different judges will ground their decisions in different factual assumptions or
114. See Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 692 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012).
115. See Wolff, supra note 82, at 763. For a useful illustration of the English legal system, see
ANDREWS, supra note 103, at 625 (arguing that representative proceedings under English rules imply
that ì[m]embers of . . . represented class are not parties to the action. Nevertheless, those class members
will receive the benefit of a res judicata decision. . . . This form of proceedings, therefore, is an opt–out
system.ê).
116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). If a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), class members
have no choice to be excluded from the class. Id.
117. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 68, at 410 (ìThe percentage of èopt outs in most class actions is
small, which could be explained by the fact that many class members, particularly in consumer and
product liability cases, are content to have the case brought on their behalf, or simply by the natural
inclination of people toward inaction in such situations.ê); see also ANDREWS, supra note 103, at 625
(ì[A] declaration in favour of a large class of represented persons can be a powerful and often decisive
element in securing individual redress . . . [and] facilitat[ing] multi–party claims for monetary redress.ê).
118. See C.P.R. 19.12(1) (Group Litigation Orders) (Eng.); see also Mulheron, supra note 103, at 44–
45 (ìAny judgment or order given on a GLO issue is binding upon other parties on the group register,
and the court can also order the extent to which a judgment will bind parties to claims which are
subsequently entered onto the register.ê (footnote omitted)).
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in different interpretations of legal principles. Put more simply, the European legal
approach provides that when a judge finds a solution of common issues in a
representative case, such a solution is binding for judges who will later be asked to
decide the claims of individual class members.
In spite of the binding force of the representative judgement, there are
sometimes plausible grounds for deciding the cases of class members differently; if
warranted, judges can decide the individual cases of class members differently from
each other or in contrast to the decision rendered in the representative case. If there
is the possibility that the decisions of such cases can diverge in meaningful ways,
that possibility suggests that the protection of class members expectations depends,
in large part, on individual consent. Where such expectations possess merit as
individual lawsuits, the binding decision of a representative case will not
necessarily deprive stakeholders of the power to exercise their substantial rights by
suing the wrongdoer.119 This dynamic lends even greater importance to the opt–in
and opt–out mechanisms discussed further below.
C. OptæOut Versus Optæin
The foregoing analysis offers two guiding principles for understanding
representative litigation in diverse legal systems. First, common law legal systems
establish the general principle that class actions, once certified, have a binding
effect on whomever the court finds to be within the membership of the class, unless
class members are entitled to opt out of the class and have chosen to exercise that
option.120 Second, European legal systems provide for a set of cases in which the
representative power of a named plaintiff must be combined with the power of
stakeholders to sue the same wrongdoer. Thus, representative litigation in European
legal systems is not fully ìrepresentative.ê The representative claimant is entitled
to bring a civil lawsuit on behalf of class members, but the adjudication of a
representative dispute can exert its binding effects on class members if, and only if,
they have consented to it by opting in.
Both mechanisms hold advantages and disadvantages, and the trade–offs are
apparent. Those who view the opt–in mechanism as paramount to private and
contractual freedom accept a substantive reduction in the representative nature of
class action. The opt–out mechanism can create destabilizing consequences for
stakeholders beyond those who directly bring class actions as named plaintiffs but
shows an inclination in favor of the representative nature within the context of class
actions.121 For instance, the need to bring individual actions may impose individual
costs and discourage class members from protecting their legitimate expectations.
Nevertheless, the binding effect exerted by the solution of common issues reduces
the destabilizing effects of different judicial decisions.122 Likewise, the opt–out
basis can reduce the costs and time of potential lawsuits, encouraging the named
plaintiff to seek relief for small amounts of money, but concentrating all decisional
powersîmainly the power to decide whether to settle or to continue litigationîon
119. See CAPPELLETTI&PERILLO, supra note 2, at 42; Rowe, supra note 2, at 159; Parker, supra note
2, at 280; Sherman, supra note 68, at 418–24.
120. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 23(b)(3), (c)(2)(B)(v), (c)(3)(B).
121. For an illustration of the debate over the opt–out and opt–in mechanisms, see Dodson, supra note
22, at 184–87; John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 3 (1983).
122. Kennedy, supra note 121, at 29.
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a class representative.123 Moreover, when the representative plaintiff enjoys a
successful outcome, the opt–out mechanism tends to impede class members from
bringing individual lawsuits because they remain subject to the binding force of the
previous decision. Similarly, despite the opt–in mechanism, when a class
representative is successful in his or her lawsuit, class members cannot bring
individual lawsuits because their individual disputes are deemed to have been
already litigated.124
IV. ITALIANCLASSACTION ANDARBITRATION
The scope of representative litigation takes yet another form within the context
of the Italian legal system. The American legal system resolves collective disputes
by relying on the opt–out mechanism and the guiding role of class certification.
European legal systems generally warrant a more active role for the judiciary in
addressing common issues of law or fact and imposing that legal reasoning on the
judges who are asked to decide the claims of class members. The tendency of the
Italian legal system, under analysis here, is to displace the centralized resolution of
common issues with the acceptance of class litigation by class members. The Italian
legal system gives import to the autonomy of individual class members to claim
their rights and to avail themselves of the final adjudication. These legal principles
reflect the long–held value of individual subjectivity by focusing attention on the
role played by the class members within the contexts of multiparty litigation and
arbitral proceedings.
A. The Italian Class Action
The dynamics of legal development at institutions like the Italian Parliament
are seemingly in a state of perpetual hesitation. This is particularly true in cases
involving new procedural rules. When the Italian legislature acknowledged the
need to reinforce representative litigation through class actions, it began crafting a
new regulatory regime. Two statutory proposals for authorizing stakeholders to
bring a collective lawsuit for money damages borne of this regime were abandoned
in 2004.125 Even when the Italian legislature enacted a new statute that authorized
collective actions for damages, it postponed its commencement both in 2008 and in
123. Even if Rule 23(e) expressly authorizes class representatives to settle ìclaims, issues, or defenses
of a certified class,ê this authority is subject to the requirement of court supervision. When the proposal
would bind class members, the judicial power to approve settlement can be exercised ìonly after a
hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.ê See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); see also
MULHERON, supra note 68, at 34; ANDREWS, supra note 103, at 626 (noting that under C.P.R. 19.6, ìthe
representative claimant or defendant is dominus litis . . . and so it follows that the representative can
compromise the claim or defense.ê).
124. SeeMicklitz & Stadler, supra note 96, at 1499; Dodson, supra note 22, at 203. For an illustration
of the English legal system, see Neil Andrews, MultiæParty Proceedings in England: Representative
and Group Actions, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 249, 262 (2001) (noting that ìmulti–party litigations
should proceed as group actions rather than as representative proceedings . . . [M]ost multi–party traffic
already takes the group action route because the representative action does not generally allow damages
to be awarded at large in favor of a class.ê).
125. See Legislative Proposals no. 3838 and 3839 presented to the Italian Parliament on March 27,
2003 available, respectively, at http://legxiv.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera
_wai.asp?PDL=3838 (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) and http://legxiv.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/
trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?PDL=3839 (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
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2009. In 2010, the legislature finally established the first Italian class action through
an amendment to the Consumer Code.126
Generally speaking, the Italian class action is effective at preserving a stable
core within the broader legal system of consumer protection. The driving concern
in the Italian legislatures decision to permit class actions was, no doubt, protecting
consumers or users in light of their common expectations. For the Italian
legislature, the solicitude for expectations of consumers or users represented
specific concerns with judicial protection in matters of standard contractual clauses,
products liability, and unfair commercial or competitive practices. When the
amendment to the Consumer Code authorized class lawsuits for money damages,
consumers and users lacked any representative means to protect themselves
individually against contractual or non–contractual detrimental acts.127
B. Comparative Analysis of Italian Class Litigation
According to Italian law, consumers and users can individually bring class
lawsuits for money damages and restitution. Alternatively, they can bring such
lawsuits by proxy, meaning through a given consumer organization. Even when
they opt to delegate an organization, stakeholders may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members of a class. The permissibility of a
class action depends on whether all requirements listed in the provisions of the
Consumer Code are satisfied. Named plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
requirements for class certification are satisfied; if so, the court will certify the class.
This set of requirements bears similarities to that of other European and Anglo–
American legal systems. For example, FRCP 23 requires the existence of
ìquestions of law or fact common to the classê128 before the case will be certified
as a class action in America. Likewise, under Rule 19.10 of the English Civil
Procedure Rules, the group litigation order requires that the claims ìgive rise to
common or related issues of fact or law.ê129 Pursuant to the Consumer Code, the
court must evaluate whether the individual rights of the named plaintiff(s) can be
126. See Consumer Code, supra note 37. For an illustration of Italian class actions, see generally Pailli
& Poncibò, supra note 37, at 355. The class action has been considered at length in Italian academic
literature. See, e.g., CLAUDIOCONSOLO&BEATRICEZUFFI, LAZIONE DICLASSE EXART. 140–BISCOD.
CONS. (2012) [The Class Action Under Article 140–bis of the Italian Consumer Code]; ANDREA
GIUSSANI, AZIONI COLLETTIVE RISARCITORIE NEL PROCESSO CIVILE (2008) [Civil Procedure and
Collective Damages Lawsuits]; ROMOLODONZELLI, LAZIONE DICLASSE ATUTELADEICONSUMATORI
(2011) [The Consumer Class Action]; Giorgio Costantino, La Tutela Collettiva Risarcitoria. Note a
Prima Lettura dell’Art. 140æbis Cod. Cons., 5 FORO ITALIANO 17 (2008) [The Collective Damages
Lawsuit. First Readings on Article 140–bis of the Italian Consumer Code]; Remo Caponi, Azioni
Collettive: Interessi Protetti e Modelli Processuali di Tutela, 5 RIVISTA DIDIRITTO PROCESSUALE 1205
(2008) [Collective Actions: Protected Interests and Procedural Models of Protection].
127. According to the Italian legal system, the protection of consumer interests was, and is, afforded
through representative actions in situations where consumer organizations are entitled to bring lawsuits
aimed at preventing unfair commercial or contractual practices. The representative nature of litigation
depends on the fact that Italian legal provisions expressly allow consumer organizations to bring lawsuits
on behalf of consumers. While some consumers receive direct and immediate protection by impeding
ongoing unfair practices that caused their individual harms, other consumers, such as those who are not
already harmed by unfair practices, receive only preventive protection because the injunctive relief
inhibits future unfair practices against consumers at large. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140;
see supra Section III(B).
128. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); see supra Section III(B).
129. See C.P.R. 19.10 (Group Litigation Orders 19.10) (Eng.); see supra Section III(B).
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described as homogenous.130 This requirement is intended to ensure that class
representatives will best represent the expectations of class members in cases
involving:
i. Contractual rights when an entrepreneur breaches contracts
with consumers or users with regard to the same type of factual
conditions or economic clauses;131
ii. Contractual and non–contractual rights when a given type of
flawed product or service harms consumers or users,132
allowing for money damages against producers, suppliers, or
retailers;133
iii. Contractual and non–contractual rights when consumers or
users are harmed by given commercial or unfair competitive
practices, abuses of market dominance, or collusion, allowing
for money damages or restitution against the same
wrongdoer.134
While the scope of class actions in Anglo–American models is defined broadly
to encompass all situations where the number of parties is high enough to make
joinder of all members ìimpracticable,ê135 the Italian legislature has narrowly
tailored its regulation of class actions to serve compelling interests of consumers
and users. This limitation reflects the fact that, over the past several decades, E.U.
institutions have devoted more of their attention to the protection of consumers and
users than any other type of stakeholders.136 These groups garner special
130. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(1). Phrased in terms of the Consumer Code,
Italian class actions can be brought for the protection of ìindividual homogenous rights.ê
131. According to article 140–bis(2)(a) of the Consumer Code, the consumer class protection refers to
ìthe contractual rights of a plurality of consumers or users who are involved in an [sic] homogenous
situation against the same business.ê It also refers to those situations in which consumers or users are
parties to a contract of adhesion under the Italian Civil Code. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art.
140–bis(2)(a); see also Civil Code, supra note 62, arts. 1341, 1342.
132. For example, when a product presents unreasonably dangerous defects or when a financial service
impedes stakeholders from accessing essential information.
133. According to article 140–bis(2)(b) of the Consumer Code, the consumer class protection refers to
ìthe individual homogenous rights of consumers with respect to products or services even when they are
not parties to a contract.ê See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(1)(b).
134. According to article 140–bis(2)(c) of the Consumer Code, the consumer class protection refers to
ìthe homogenous rights to the compensation of damages occurred to consumers or users for unfair
commercial or competitive practices.ê See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(1)(c).
135. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
136. Class action regulation provides a special means of joining parties who are consumers or users
within the context of E.U. law. See, e.g., Astrid Stadler, Group Actions as a Remedy to Enforce
Consumer Interests, in NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 305 (Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans–W. Micklitz eds., 2009) (ìThe
European Commission takes class actions or group actions . . . into consideration as a means of enhancing
private enforcement in antitrust and consumer law.ê); Geoffrey P. Miller, Compensation and Deterrence
in Consumer Class Actions in the United States and Europe, in NEW FRONTIERS OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 263, 279 (Fabrizio
Cafaggi & Hans–W. Micklitz eds., 2009). The E.U. recently presented a Proposal of Directive on
European representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers. See supra
note 52.
29
Gaboardi: New Ways of Protecting Collective Interests: Italian Class Litiga
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
90 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2020
protections because they typically represent the weaker party in matters of
contracting and commercial transactions and are inherently subjected to an
inequality of bargaining power or contractual imbalance.137 These protections are
interpreted and applied in a restrictive manner, reinforcing the fact that
representative lawsuits and class actions are, and will remain, a means of protecting
only certain types of stakeholders.
Italian law requires the court to consider the question of homogeneity, meaning
substantial commonality, among claims. This requirement can be equated to a
typicality test because it ensures that strong similarities exists between the interests
of class representatives and those of absent class members. If the claim of the class
representative arises from the same event or course of conduct as the class claims,
and if it involves the same legal rules or remedies, the case will be certified as a
class action. Differences among the claims do not prevent class certification if they
are compatible with the homogeneity of claims. Compatibility is dependent on the
fact that the salient circumstances of individual cases are a typical and
representative sample of the class claims. Disparities between claims are deemed
intolerable only when they resulted from a significantly different course of action.
For example, it may be that the lack of homogeneity depends on limited or irregular
distributions of a given type of product or service among consumers or users.
The court is also called upon to decide questions regarding the ability of named
plaintiffs to adequately represent the class. Italian law requires the court to be
particularly attentive to evaluating whether a class representative improperly
deviates from the interests of class members. Even if the court can exercise
discretion in this determination, potential conflicts of interest and deficiencies in
moral or economic integrity are sufficient to render class representatives
inadequate.138 These requirements provide ample room for judicial authority to
operate. Crucial to class actions is a need to protect the interests of class members
who play a less active role than parties engaged in a conventional litigation. The
fate of a class action cannot be influenced by unfair behaviors of class
representatives, so class representatives adequacy and trustworthiness are
indispensable, and deficienciesîwhether moral deficiencies of the proposed
individual or factual discrepancies between his or her case and the case of other
class membersîpose significant obstacles to bringing a class action.
Italian class certification carries similarities to the traditional grounds on which
class certification is commonly justified in American law, but there are also crucial
differences between the Italian legal regime and common law tradition. The most
notable differences are twofold, and they are equally relevant in determining
whether Italian class actions may be asserted in arbitral proceedings. First, Italian
law requires that not only the defendant, but also the public prosecutor be served
with original process via copies of the summons and complaint. Notifying a public
137. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 388
(2012) (arguing that ìthe class action is a primary mechanism of independent challenge to mass–scale
wrongdoing . . . in the domain of consumer law, where the asymmetries of scale between mass marketers
and individuals allow the former to control standard form contracting.ê); Reich & Micklitz, supra note
4, at 46, 48.
138. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(6). To judge the adequacy of representation,
courts may evaluate a panoply of factors including, but not limited to, moral and economic integrity.
They call to mind considerations such as the honesty and trustworthiness of the named plaintiff or the
ability of the class representative to represent the class as the most adequate plaintiff with respect to
experience, expertise, intellect, and financial resources.
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prosecutor that a class action has been filed against a wrongdoer facilitates the
application of criminal law. For example, a class lawsuit may challenge a
widespread practice or policy affecting class representatives and class members,
such as unfair commercial practices or sales of defective goods. If Italian law
criminalizes such individual behaviors, the fact that the existing Italian rules
provide this notice to prosecutors serves as a useful device to promote criminal
prosecution.
Second, the Italian class action not only represents a break from conventional,
non–representative litigation, but also from existing representative litigation
because the parties who bring a class action can be organizations or individuals. As
a result, Italian law governs the new representative action without completely
disavowing the model of individual subjectivity. Even if the class representative
brings the class lawsuit on behalf of other stakeholders, class members are asked to
individually decide whether they choose to adhere to the class action. By
maintaining a focus on individual subjectivity, Italian law requires that the class
action proceed on an opt–in basis for class members.
The problem with the opt–in mechanism is not with its efficiency,139 but with
the uncertainty of its legal boundaries. Class members are simply authorized to
adhere to the case certified as a class action.140 The choice to opt in must take the
form of written consent filed with the court, but no special form is mandated.
Consent is necessary in order for a judicial decision to bind class members, but
additional issues that deviate from the common questions of law or fact cannot arise
from their individual claims.141 By submitting to a class action, class members are
entitled to declare themselves bound by the final decision. Their declaration also
implies a blanket waiver of individual lawsuits against the defendant.142 In other
words, notwithstanding their individual consent, class members are not authorized
to individually sue the defendant. Consequently, proposals to settle a case must be
submitted to the entire class for approval because the compromise binds each
member of the class (though Italian law authorizes the parties to settle claims,
issues, or defenses without the approval of the court).
While the opt–out model requires parties to resort to court supervision in order
to prevent conflicts of interest between class representatives and passive class
members, the opt–in model allows active class members to control the wisdom of
139. See Dodson, supra note 22, at 188–89 (arguing that ìa uniform opt–out regime will work well for
some classes but poorly for others, just as a uniform opt–in regime will work well for some classes but
poorly for others. The problem is that a rigidly uniform system will not fit all cases well. The solution
is to allow flexibility through choice. . . . The better course is to give the class the choice.ê); see also
Miller, supra note 136, at 280 (ìThe opt–in approach offers two advantages: it ensures that people who
participate in the litigation are actually interested in the outcome; and it addresses the jurisprudential
perception that litigation is not legitimate if a party who has committed no actionable wrong is subjected
to a preclusive judgment without voluntarily agreeing to participate.ê).
140. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(3), (9)(b). According to these rules, consumers
and users who wants to avail themselves of the protection provided by this article are called upon to
adhere to class action. Id. at art. 140–bis(3). They also dictate that adherence implies waiver of
individual compensation and restitution lawsuits. Id. Finally, they require that class members
declarations are to be filed with the clerk of court within, at most, 120 days after the publication of notice
of class certification. Id. at art. 140–bis(9)(b).
141. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(14). This rule specifies that all partiesîthat is,
both class representatives and class membersîare bound by final judgment, while those class members
who have chosen not to adhere to the class action can bring individual lawsuits against the wrongdoer.
142. Id.
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the settlement. Thus, even if the opt–in model allows parties to settle their disputes
without giving the power to approve or veto settlement to the court, those class
members who do not settle their claims are entitled to bring individual lawsuits
against the wrongdoer.143 The same is true of many other cases that occur with
some regularity in practice, such as voluntary dismissal or compromise.144
The Italian approach to class actions evinces a remarkable ambivalence. On
the one hand, it combines the power to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a class of
stakeholders with the need to accept the binding effect of final judgment, thereby
warranting extensive consideration. On the other hand, the approach is inclined to
give ample regard to class members consent, avoiding judicial discretion in
determining whether class members are bound by a judgment, and focusing instead
on according respect to individual intentions. For example, the challenges inherent
in the opt–inmechanism justify a more active role for the court in assuring that class
members receive notice of the action.145 This judicial activism depends on the
premise that assessing the impacts of class actions serves as a basis for determining
whether the opt–in mechanism is useful in protecting individual expectations. An
informed choice to opt in and be bound by the final judgement requires that
stakeholders receive adequate levels of information about the factual backdrop that
affects putative class members.146
The importance of individual consent in class action litigation leads to the
question of whether or not class action arbitration is consistent with the Italian legal
system. This prospect is particularly intriguing in light of the consensual basis of
arbitration in which the civil law tradition is deeply grounded. Viewed through the
lens of arbitration, the class action becomes an element of legal protection that must
be reconsidered to determine whether it is admissible in the context of arbitral
proceedings, and whether it requires extensive adjustments to individual behaviors
of stakeholders.
C. Interplay Between Italian Class Actions and Arbitration
While class action arbitration represents an ordinary part of legal protection
within the Anglo–American tradition, Italian scholars have not scrutinized the
interplay between class actions and arbitration.147 This is not because class
litigation has not garnered appreciable reliance in the Italian legal system, but
because many Italian stakeholders may overestimate the weaknesses or
underestimate the strengths of class actions. The absence of written provisions can
143. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(15). Italian law implicitly requires that proposals
to settle the case be submitted to all class members for approval. It does not, however, have the effect
of giving the power to approve or veto settlement to the court. Moreover, article 140–bis(15) expressly
authorizes class members to bring individual lawsuits against the wrongdoer when they have not
consented to settlement of class action.
144. Id.
145. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(9).
146. Dodson, supra note 22, at 197 (declaring that ìan affirmative expression to opt in to class
membership is a much clearer manifestation of informed consent.ê).
147. See Gabriele Crespi Reghizzi & Matteo Dragoni, Class Action and Arbitration ProceduresæItaly,
in CLASS ARBITRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 115 (Philippe Billiet ed., 2013); see also Antonio
Briguglio, Class Arbitration in Italia: spunti di metodo per la (eventuale) prosecuzione delle indagini,
2 RIVISTA DELLARBITRATO 219 (2015) [Class Arbitration in Italy: Hints of Method for the Possible
Continuation of Analysis]; Marcello Gaboardi, Arbitrato e azione di classe, 4–5 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO
PROCESSUALE 987 (2014) [Arbitration and Class Action].
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impede stakeholders from precisely recognizing all their rights and expectations. In
other words, even if class action arbitration is not expressly forbidden by Italian
law, the lack of legal provisions authorizing class arbitration necessitates a more
complex approach to large–scale arbitration. One might contend that normative
silence on class action arbitration weighs against class arbitration practice, although
it seems to reflect a disregard for arbitration agreement itself. Alternatively, one
may be persuaded by the importance of individual consent that class disputes are
entitled to go to arbitral tribunals even in the absence of any legal provision
authorizing such.148 The latter position is reasonably more consistent with the
modern characterization of the Italian approach to arbitration and its contemporary
practice. Nevertheless, class litigation has found general acceptance in the Italian
legal culture.149
In the Italian legal system, the main problem with class arbitration lies in the
difficulties inherent in reconciling it with the traditional model of individual
subjectivity and the selective role played by individual consent in arbitration
agreements. Italian law is generally inclined toward individual litigation. This
restrictive view tends to reduce legal consideration of representative litigation
because it allows representative lawsuits to be brought exclusively in cases in which
a specific legal provision exists. Even if an individuals access to justice operates
as an absolute,150 bringing a lawsuit on behalf of other stakeholders represents an
exceptional rule. For this reason, in approaching the issue of class arbitration,
Italian scholars tend to use the exceptional regulatory regime of class action to
entrench restrictive interpretations of class arbitration. For example, some Italian
scholars believe that the output of the class arbitration analysisîthat is, the answer
to the question of whether the class action arbitration is compatible with the Italian
legal systemîmust be weighed against the value of individual consent in the
arbitration agreement.151 According to this opinion, even if Italian law
acknowledges the possibility of multiparty arbitration, it does not grant exceptions
in which a multiparty arbitration does not reflect the fact that all the parties to a
contract have signed the same arbitration agreement.152 These legal limitations on
arbitrability of different, but related disputes represent another objection to
admitting class arbitration within the Italian legal debate.
Italian law suggests a restrictive view of multiparty arbitration, but it must be
adapted to those frequent situations in which multiparty disputes arise from
different contracts. Even when several parties enter into a variety of different, but
related contracts containing different, but related arbitration provisions, all issues
in the dispute should be resolved within the same set of legal proceedings rather
than within many different, but related proceedings. The current preference is
understandable given the difficulty of achieving consistency across different
148. Cf. Gaboardi, supra note 147, at 1005–06.
149. In 2016, forty cases were still pending. Only ten cases were certified as class actions, and only
three cases were also adjudicated. In eighteen cases, formal defects such as lack of legal requirements
were the basis for denial of class certification. Osservatorio permanente sullapplicazione delle regole
di concorrenza, available at https://www.osservatorioantitrust.eu/it/azioni-di-classe-incardinate-nei-tri
bunali-italiani-2018/.
150. See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 7, at 268; Feldman, supra note 3, at 70.
151. See Briguglio, supra note 147, at 224; see also Crespi Reghizzi & Dragoni, supra note 147, at
133–34.
152. See infra Section IV(D).
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cases.153 Depending on parties allegations, different arbitrators could give varying
import to different, but related facts. Different arbitrators could also adopt different
views of the applicable substantive rules. Therefore, class arbitration analyses
should be conducted not only in light of Italian arbitration law, but also in light of
what the parties to an arbitration agreement have specifically decided to submit to
arbitration. Individual consent thus plays a crucial role in adapting the normative
core of Italian arbitration law to class disputes arising from different contracts.
D. The Differences Between Multiparty Disputes
in Litigation and Arbitration
In court proceedings, the rules governing both joinder of additional parties154
and consolidation of separate proceedings155 reduce the risk that the unique
procedural choices of parties to different, but related contract disputes will produce
different decisions. Likewise, joinder and consolidation foster judicial consistency
and coherence across cases involving common issues of fact or law.156 To the
contrary, the consensual basis of arbitration makes it reasonable to require all the
parties to a multiparty contract who are in dispute to sue or be sued in the same
arbitration when they have expressly recorded their consent to joinder of parties in
the contractîor in an arbitration clauseîfrom the outset. For these reasons, Italian
arbitration rules warrant the same level of deference toward individual choices
accorded to multiparty arbitration in other legal systems.
By speaking in terms of a plurality of parties that extends to both permissive
and compulsory joinder, article 816–quater of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure
(ìCode of Civil Procedureê)157 authorizes each of the parties to amultiparty contract
to bring suits for breaches of contract against other parties in an arbitral tribunal.
Such a possibility depends on whether the plaintiff(s) and the defendant(s) are
bound by the same arbitration agreement and the ways in which the arbitration
agreement allows the parties to appoint the arbitrator(s).158 Alternatively, article
816–quater of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes multiparty arbitration by
allowing the plaintiff(s) to appoint one or more arbitrators and the defendant(s) to
agree upon the same number of arbitrators or the appointing authority. Though this
rule portrays litigants as parties to the same arbitration agreement, it can be applied
153. See generally Sherman, supra note 68, at 401 (ì[The class action] serves the interests of economy
by not having to try the same issues again and again in separate cases. It also serves the interests of
consistency and finality by avoiding the possibility of inconsistent outcomes in separate trials of similar
cases and resolving all claims in a single case that is binding on all class members.ê).
154. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19, 20. See C.P.R. 6.20(3)(b) (Service of Documents) (Eng.); see
Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Code of Civil Procedure], §§ 59–61 (German Civil Procedure Statute, §§
59–61) (Ger.); see CODE DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE [CPC] [Civil Procedure Code] art. 325 (Fr.).
155. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42; see also Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. IDC Properties, Inc., 482
F. Supp. 2d 203, 206 (D.R.I. 2007); Arnold v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 1982).
156. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a); see also Malcom v. Natl Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1993);
Doug Brady, Inc. v. New Jersey Bldg. Laborers Statewide Funds, 250 F.R.D. 171 (D.N.J. 2008).
157. See C.P.C. n. 1443, Apr. 21, 1942 (Italian Code of Civil Procedure of 1942, Pub. L. No. 1443)
(It.) [hereinafter Code of Civil Procedure], translated and reprinted in SIMONA GROSSI & MARIA
CRISTINA PAGNI, COMMENTARYON THE ITALIANCODEOFCIVILPROCEDURE app. B (2010). The source
contains several arbitration rules (arts. 806–840) designed to both promote arbitration agreements and
shape arbitral proceedings.
158. See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 157, art. 816–quarter(1).
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regardless of whether all litigants agree upon the same arbitrator(s) or the
appointing authority.159
Multiparty arbitration is protected only insofar as all parties agree upon the
arbitrator(s) or the appointing authority. This means that, according to Italian law,
multiparty arbitration can find expression in those cases in which litigants are
parties either to the same arbitration clause, the same arbitration agreement related
to a given contract, or a dispute grounded in a given contract.160
Article 816–quater of the Code of Civil Procedure imposes certain restrictions
on multiparty arbitrations when arbitrator(s) are not jointly selected by the parties
or by the appointing authority.161 Compared to other legal systems, Italian law
ascribes great importance to the consequences of deviating from the rules governing
the selection of arbitrator(s). By drawing a rigid line between permissive and
compulsory joinder of parties, Italian law provides a mechanism for transforming
collective arbitration into something more consistent with the different choices of
arbitrators when a common question of law or fact makes joinder appropriate
(although not mandatory).162 In these situations, the collective arbitration must be
divided into as many two–party arbitrations as there are disputes arising under a
given contract.163 By contrast, if parties to a contract must be joined as plaintiffs or
defendants,164 the dispute is completely exempt from any collective arbitration
proceedings when the alternative mechanisms for jointly selecting the arbitrator(s)
are unworkable (i.e., because the parties do not agree upon the same panel of
arbitrators or the same appointing authority).165
E. Italian Class Action Arbitration
The absence of legal provisions authorizing class arbitration might be
problematic in several respects.166 If the inquiry into class arbitration is a mere
question of legislative enactment, it necessarily follows that class arbitration is not
currently available to protect individual and collective interests in Italy.
Nevertheless, simply because Italian law has not expressly authorized class
arbitration does not mean that judges or arbitrators are bound to deny stakeholders
this form of legal protection. Class arbitration appears as a necessary component
of any system of legal protection that aims to be complete.
The experience of class litigation in Italy demonstrates that this type of
representative litigation is not solely the product of a legal systems ability to adapt
and respond to normative changes.167 It is also the result of reasoned deliberation
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., LAURA SALVANESCHI, LARBITRATO CON PLURALITÀ DI PARTI (1999) [Multiparty
Arbitration]; Gian Franco Ricci, Art. 816æquater, in ARBITRATO 533 (Federico Carpi ed., 3d ed. 2016)
[Comment on the Article 816–quater of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, Arbitration]; Crespi
Reghizzi & Dragoni, supra note 147, at 128 (ì[T]hird party voluntary intervention and its attraction to
the arbitral proceedings always require the agreement of the third party concerned, all the arbitrators and
all the parties to the arbitration, unless we deal with situations of necessary joinder of party.ê).
161. See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 157, art. 816–quater.
162. Id. at art. 103; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 20.
163. See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 157, art. 816–quater.
164. Id. at art. 102; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 19.
165. See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 157, art. 816–quater.
166. See Crespi Reghizzi & Dragoni, supra note 147, at 133–34.
167. The modern approach to the judicial protection of collective and individual interests tends to
emphasize the importance of representative litigation for its potential benefits in terms of decisional
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based on the perceived virtues of class litigation. Such normative choice implies
that because class disputes can be resolved through class litigation, there are
compelling reasons to accept class arbitration when it is justified by an arbitral
agreement. Rejecting class action arbitration in light of factors including the
normative framework would mean reducing the incidence of individual and
collective protection within the Italian legal system. Class disputes can actually
arise in the context of consumer contracts and commercial transactions. Italian law
promotes class litigation as a way of avoiding a number of costly and complex
individual litigations. Thus, when parties agree to submit class disputes to
arbitration, a normative framework silent on class arbitration should not pose any
real obstacle to its practical application.168
Even if class arbitration seems to be compatible with the normative core of
Italian class actions, there remains the question of whether the arbitration agreement
itself can be silent on class arbitration. The United States Supreme Court faced this
interpretative challenge in a series of seminal cases that collectively suggest a
solution to the problem of silent arbitration agreements applicable even to Italian
legal practice. In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,169 the Supreme Court
explained that arbitral tribunals, not judges, have the exclusive power to decide the
question of whether class disputes can be submitted to arbitration considering the
arbitration agreement.170 Along with defending the conviction that the arbitral
tribunal plays a crucial role in determining the concrete relevance of class
arbitration, the Court concluded that an arbitration clause, though silent on class–
wide arbitration, can be interpreted as implicitly consenting to class arbitration.
Even if Bazzle has been viewed as an engine of normative activism in favor of class
arbitration,171 it produced a feeling of ambiguity and uncertainty by authorizing
class proceedings on grounds of implicit consent.172
Post–Bazzle cases led to different interpretations of arbitration clauses silent on
class arbitration. StoltæNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.173 invoked the
efficiency as well as reduction of costs. Several European legal systems used class litigation to entrench
the legal protection of consumers and users interests. The Institutions of the European Union are being
asked to craft a new regulatory regime authorizing a consumer class action that can be brought across
the entire E.U. See supra Section III(B).
168. Cf. Gaboardi, supra note 147, at 1005.
169. 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion).
170. Id. at 450–51.
171. See Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, AM. ARBITRATION ASSN (Oct. 8, 2003), https:/
/www.adr.org/sites/default/files/documt_repository/Supplementary%20Rules%20for%%20Class%20A
rbitrations/pdf.
172. See, e.g., S.I. STRONG, CLASS, MASS, AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2013); Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide
Arbitration: Arbitral Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 301, 312 (2004); Jean R.
Sterling & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient
Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse, 67 LAW&CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 102–03 (2004); Richard
A. Nagareda, The LitigationæArbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1069, 1100 (2011); Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 MARQ.
L. REV. 1103, 1139 (2011); Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy,
22 AM. REV. INTL ARB. 435, 440 (2011) (noting that ìto pose the question in this wayîdoes the
agreement èforbid class arbitration, or is it merely èsilent?îis inevitably to sow the seeds of future
confusion.ê); Thomas J. Stipanovich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: StoltæNielsen, RentæAæCenter,
Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INTLARB. 323, 331 (2011).
173. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
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Federal Arbitration Act (ìFAAê)174 to support the conclusion that when an
arbitration agreement is silent on class disputes, the mere consent to arbitrate is not
sufficient to include class action among the selected types of arbitrable disputes.
The point simply is that there are crucial differences between bilateral arbitration
and class–wide arbitration. The pivotal distinction is that while the former is a basic
and confidential two–party arbitration, the latter is a complex and costly proceeding
involving a number of parties through a representative mechanism. Thus,
irrespective of whether the dispute arises outside ìthe realm of èadhesive
contracts,ê175 meaning standardized consumer contracts, the StoltæNielsen Court
portrayed class arbitration as completely inconsistent with mere consent to
arbitrate.176
Finally, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion177 reinforced a rigid approach to
class arbitration. In a five–to–four decision, the Supreme Court treated the
differences between one–to–one arbitration and class arbitration as deserving of
careful attention because they would be reason enough to exclude the
unconscionability of class action waivers in consumer contracts.178 The Court held
the Discover Bank test, which was created by the California Supreme Court179 for
the purpose of evaluating whether a class action waiver in consumer contracts is
unconscionable, violated the substantive law of arbitrability under the FAA.180
According to the majority, because the arbitration agreement is ìvalid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, as a matter of federal law, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract,ê181 the fact that an arbitration clause
is silent on class arbitration and the parties agree upon a class action waiver does
not imply that the arbitration clause is unconscionable.182 For present purposes, the
174. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1990) [hereinafter FAA]; StoltæNielsen, 559 U.S.
at 682 (stating that ìthe central or èprimary purpose of the FAA is to ensure that èprivate agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.ê (quoting Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989))); Am. Express Co. v. Italians
Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) (stating that the FAA requires courts to ìrigorously enforce
arbitration agreements according to their terms, including terms that specify with whom the parties
choose to arbitrate their disputes.ê (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted)).
175. See Stipanovich, supra note 172, at 330; see also S.I. Strong, The Sounds of Silence: Are U.S.
Arbitrators Creating Internationally Enforceable Awards when Ordering Class Arbitration in Cases of
Contractual Silence or Ambiguity?, 30 MICH. J. INTL L. 1017, 1083–91 (2009).
176. See S.I. Strong,Does Class Arbitration )Change the Nature’ of Arbitration? StoltæNielsen, AT&T,
and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201 (2012); see also Terry F. Moritz &
Brandon J. Fitch, The Future of Consumer Arbitration in Light of StoltæNielsen, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 265 (2011); Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 172, at 1137; Nagareda, supra note 172, at 1101;
Rau, supra note 172, at 447; Stipanovich, supra note 172, at 328.
177. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
178. For an illustration of class action waivers doctrines, see generally STRONG, supra note 172, at
210–27; Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced Legislative Response,
47 AM. BUS. L.J. 361 (2010); William H. Baker, Class Action Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J.OFCONFLICT
RESOL. 335 (2009); Diana M. Link & Richard A. Bales, Waiving Rights Goodbye: Class Action Waivers
in Arbitration Agreements After StoltæNielsen v. AnimalFeeds International, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
275 (2011).
179. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
180. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348 (ìThe conclusion follows that class arbitration, to the extent it is
manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA.ê); STRONG, supra
note 172, at 207; Rau, supra note 172, at 524; Stipanovich, supra note 172, at 371.
181. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1990).
182. See Strong, supra note 176, at 241–68; Rau, supra note 172, at 507 (arguing that ì[i]n Concepcion
the power of courts to hold a class–action waiver to be èunconscionable was severely truncated, if not
indeed eliminated entirely.ê (footnote omitted)); Stipanovich, supra note 172, at 371 (ìThe subject
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key takeaway is that, notwithstanding contractual provisions purporting to waive
class action, the Discover Bank rule allowed parties to arbitrate a class–wide
dispute. In particular, class arbitration becomes workable under the Discover Bank
rule when the arbitration agreement, though silent on class arbitration, is not only
part of a consumer contract of adhesion involving a small amount of damages, but
also coupled with a ìschemeê of the party with superior bargaining power to
ìdeliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of
money.ê183 However, the Court underscored that class action waivers should not
be treated as unconscionable and unworthy of protection because they reflect
parties willingness to waive class arbitration and select bilateral arbitration. This
is the crucial point raised by the majority in Concepcion.
The trouble with the majority opinion is that even if the Court has emphasized
class arbitration waivers as a matter of consent, it has expressed disfavor toward
implicit class arbitration. According to the plurality, structural inefficiencies would
make class–wide arbitration unsuitable for advancing ìefficient, streamlined
proceduresê as envisioned by the FAA.184 With such a theory in place, there would
be no room for class–wide arbitration if the parties do not expressly agree to
arbitrate a class dispute. Because Concepcions protection of class action waivers
continues to be a matter of extensive debate in American literature,185 it is worth
noting that Justice Breyer, in his opinion on behalf of the four dissenting justices,
asserted that class arbitration is not only ìconsistentê186 with the purposes of
arbitration, but also compatible with its ìcountervailing advantages.ê187 Justice
Breyer was not persuaded by the majoritys treatment of class action waivers. As
Justice Breyer saw it, class action waivers ìcannot fairly be characterized as a
targeted attack on arbitrationê188 because of their consensual nature. In defending
his position, he reasoned that consolidated proceedings neutralize the threat of
transaction costs associated with individual disputes.
The pronouncements in Concepcion demonstrate that the arguments for
protecting class arbitration waivers face serious challenges. Nevertheless, the
majoritys treatment of such waivers serves as an additional justification for the
Supreme Courts approach to class arbitration. Such an approach, especially as
revealed in Bazzle and StoltæNielsen, emphasizes the role of individual consent in
class action arbitration. Therefore, if the Supreme Court assigns reduced
importance to arbitration agreements silent on class arbitration, it requires that
class–wide arbitration openly reflect the subjective intentions of the arbitration
agreements framers.
arbitration agreement, which had been modified with several seemingly consumer–friendly terms in
response to earlier judicial decisions, offered [in Concepcion] an unusually strong potential
counterweight to concerns about overreaching in adhesion contracts.ê); Reskin, supra note 20, at 113;
Ann Marie Tracey & Shelley McGill, Seeking a Rational Lawyer for Consumer Claims After the
Supreme Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion , 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
435 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice,
90 ORE. L. REV. 703 (2012); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); Ernst & Young, LLP v.
Morris, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); Natl Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 1612;
(2018); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
183. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1101.
184. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344.
185. See Stipanovich, supra note 172, at 380.
186. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 365.
188. Id. at 362.
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These implications appear perfectly consistent with the Italian legal system.
Indeed, the absence of any regulatory regime authorizing class arbitration makes it
necessary to require an explicit agreement to arbitrate class disputes. The new
regulatory regime crafted by the Italian legislature189 frames class actions as an
essential means of reinforcing the protection of consumer interests within the Italian
legal system. If that assumption is correct, it might follow that when stakeholders
expressly agree that class disputes arising from their contractual or non–contractual
relations with a given wrongdoer190 are subject to arbitration, the specific
characteristics of Italian class litigation should not pose insurmountable obstacles
to class action arbitration.
Some academic scholars are reluctant to acknowledge the legitimacy of class
arbitration within the Italian legal system. If class disputes are submitted to
arbitration, they argue, then the process of appointing arbitrators in multiparty
disputes under article 816–quater of the Code of Civil Procedure makes it
impossible to assert that arbitrators have been appointed by all the parties in
dispute.191 That critique would be true if the process of appointing arbitrators in
multiparty disputes was unable to adapt itself to the core features of class litigation.
The opt–in mechanism, however, can be used to reshape class members into third
parties and allow their participation in an ongoing class arbitration. There is an
interpretative reframing that provides a rational basis for class action arbitration in
Italy, but that reframing requires that arbitration agreements expressly authorize
class arbitration and class member intervention. Thus, the normative silence on
class arbitration can be overcome by arbitration agreements explicit on the subject
of class actions.192
F. The Intervention of Third Parties in the Proceedings
For further analysis, it is necessary to distinguish between situations where
litigants are parties to the same contract from those in which they are parties to
different, but related contracts. The former refers to an arbitration agreement that
is common to all the parties to a given contract, while the latter deals with several
arbitration agreements or several contracts including arbitration clauses. Article
816–quater of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes a multiparty arbitration
agreement in situations where such an agreement represents a common approach to
the dispute, meaning it represents parties common volition. A rule based
exclusively on parties common consent implies that all the parties agree upon the
same arbitral tribunal. Instead, when stakeholders are parties to different, but
related contracts, their individual expectations to jointly submit a dispute involving
two or more contracts to arbitration should receive a different level of consideration.
When there is a functional relationship between two or more contracts, the
interested parties to a contract can join ongoing litigation between the parties to a
related contract. This conclusion is directly grounded in Italian procedural rules.
189. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis.
190. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(2)(a)(b)(c).
191. See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 157, art. 816–quarter.
192. See generally STRONG, supra note 172, at 258 (noting that ìconcerns about whether and to what
extent class relief constitutes a remedy need not bar class arbitrations from being defined as a form of
regulatory arbitration, since traditional types of remedies . . . can be combined with class relief in such
a way that a number of class arbitrations fall within the definition of regulatory arbitration.ê).
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According to such rules, what is necessary to allow interested parties to intervene
is first a question of law or facts that are common to the applicants claim or defense
and the pending litigation.193 This feature reflects the functional relationship
between the two concrete disputes because their factual or legal similarity depends
on both disputes relying on the same unsettled issues. Moreover, this feature
implies that it is appropriate to consistently decide both disputes in order to prevent
two separate and potentially opposing decisions. As discussed previously, different
judges can evince different approaches to the resolution of the same question of fact
or law. Italian procedural rules also require something more for purposes of making
a third partys intervention workable. This second requirement is meant to qualify
the functional relationship between the related disputes posed by the existence of
common questions of law or fact. Indeed, what authorizes third parties to intervene
in an ongoing litigation is also the fact that third parties claims or defenses are
totally or partially incompatible with the claims or defenses of those already parties.
The incompatibility between claims or defenses must be interpreted as matter of
substantive law; it means that the judicial decision to admit the claim of the original
party implies that the claim of the third party will be necessarily rejected, and vice
versa. Sometimes the claim or defense of the third party can be qualified as
incompatible with the original claim or defense because it concerns a property or
contract right that exists only as an absolute, individual right irreconcilable with the
claims or defenses of all the original parties.194 Other times the claim of the third
party can be defined as partially incompatible with the claims of the original parties
because it is reconcilable with one of the claims of the original parties.195
To summarize: when the claim or defense of the third party involves a common
question of fact or law and it is also compatible with the claims or defenses of the
original parties, a party to a contract that can be described as related to the contract
that has been submitted to the ongoing litigation is authorized to intervene in such
litigation. The account that emerges is one in which the relevance of disputes
concerning different, but related contracts is strictly linked to the normative regime
of third–party intervention in private litigation. It also carries important
implications for resolving the question of whether those types of contractual
disputes can be submitted to arbitration.
When the related contracts include similar or, at least, compatible arbitration
clauses, legal systems tend to allow an applicant to intervene in a pending
arbitration, even though the permission to intervene depends, in part, on the
discretion of the arbitral tribunal and on the consent of all the parties in dispute.196
193. See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 157, arts. 103, 105(1); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(2).
194. For example, when the disputes arise on a property issue, the existence of the property right can
be affirmed exclusively in favor of one of the parties.
195. For example, in cases of joint liability, when a co–debtor wants to intervene in the ongoing
litigation to seek a motion on the merits, he also tends to support the similar defense of the other co–
debtor against the common creditor.
196. For the Italian legal system, see Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 157, art. 816–quarter; see
generally S.I. Strong, Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: An Infringement
of Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure?, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 915, 938
(1998) (ìCourts have . . . been reluctant to consolidate arbitrations without the parties consent. Although
some U.S. courts have been known to permit consolidation, others have not. European courts have
generally been disinclined to consolidate arbitrations without the consent of the parties unless they can
identify a theoretically acceptable alternative to express consent. Lack of privity of contract is typically
the obstacle to consolidation, as it is with joinder and intervention.ê (footnotes omitted)); see also
STAVROS L. BREKOULAKIS, THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2010);
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This is particularly true of the Italian legal regime governing situations in which
persons not already parties may intervene in existing arbitration. Article 816–
quinquies of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes third parties to intervene in a
pending arbitration (i) when they are parties to a related contract or, more generally,
they are involved in the same set of contractual or non–contractual facts depending
on a common question of law or fact;197 (ii) their claims or defenses are totally or
partially incompatible with the claims or defenses of those already parties; and (iii)
their intervention is based not only on the explicit consent of the arbitral tribunal,
but also on a specific agreement between persons who are already parties and those
who attempt to intervene.198
The foregoing analysis suggests that there are two principal ways to explain the
intervention of third parties in arbitration under Italian procedural law. First, third
parties seeking to intervene in arbitration can be singled out as parties to the same
contract that original parties have submitted to arbitration. In this case, both original
and third parties are signatories of the same arbitration provision. Thus, original
parties claims and defenses are inextricably linked to third parties claims or
defenses. Second, a party to a contract including an arbitration agreement can seek
to intervene in a pending arbitration when it concerns a related contract between
two or more completely (or partially) different parties. In this case, the intervenor
is party to a contract that is different from, although related to the contract originally
submitted to arbitration. The implication is that the link between third parties
claims or defenses and original parties claims and defenses is weaker in this case
than in the previous case involving the same contract. This weakness depends not
only on the fact that the contract originally involved in arbitration and the contract
submitted to arbitration by the third party are different, at least partially, in their
content, parties, and arbitration agreements.
Even though those differences reduce the impact of a third partys intervention
in an ongoing arbitration in cases of related contracts, it is worth considering one
exception that might enable a party to a related contract to intervene in arbitration.
In such situations, the third party who is signatory to a related contract can intervene
in an ongoing arbitration when: (i) the ongoing arbitration concerns a different, but
related contract; (ii) the related contracts contain arbitration clauses that authorize
each party to intervene in the ongoing arbitration concerning the related contract;
and (iii) both the original party and the arbitral tribunal consent to the intervention
MatthewD. Schwartz,Multiparty Disputes and Consolidated Arbitrations: An Oxymoron or the Solution
to a Continuing Dilemma?, 22 CASEW. RES. J. INTL L. 341 (1990).
197. According to Italian law, third parties are entitled to intervene in a pending arbitration not only
when their intervention is treated as a matter of discretion, but also when it emerges as a matter of
compulsion. The former situation is characterized by the existence of a common question of law or fact
between the claim (or defense) of the person attempting to intervene and the pending arbitration. The
latter situation arises when the absence of a person reduces the likelihood that the arbitrator can provide
justice for those already parties or be detrimental to the third parties themselves. See Code of Civil
Procedure, supra note 157, arts. 105(1), 816–quinquies(2). Third–party intervention is applicable to
situations in which a non–contractual relation (i.e., a relation concerning tortious obligations or
obligations that arise from unjust enrichment and analogous doctrines) exists between the original parties
to the arbitration, or at least one of them, and the third party. According to article 808–bis of the Code
of Civil Procedure, persons involved in a non–contractual situation can submit their claims to arbitration
under a specific arbitration agreement. This legal provision also justifies intervention by third parties in
an ongoing arbitration when the case deals with the same non–contractual situation or with a different,
but related non–contractual situation. See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 157, art. 808–bis(1).
198. See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 157, art. 816–quinquies(1), (2).
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of the third party under appropriate circumstances, which arise when the ongoing
arbitration and the intervention of the third party concern related contracts and
intervention is expressly authorized by existing legal rules. These situations are
consistent with the Italian regulatory regime of third–party intervention in ongoing
arbitration.
The first conditionîthe relationship between the contract that the original
parties have submitted to arbitration and the contract that the third party attempts to
use as a basis for interventionîreflects the ample room that Italian arbitration law
accords to intervention. According to the Code of Civil Procedure, arbitrators who
are faced with a request to intervene will look first to the existence of common
questions of law or fact between the claims or defenses of the original parties and
the claims or defenses of the third party. Even when those claims and defenses
concern different contracts, a common question of law or fact remains adequate to
justify the intervention in an ongoing arbitration if the claims or defenses of the
original parties and the claims or defenses of the third party depend on the resolution
of that common question.199 These requirements are compatible with the legal
framework of Italian class actions.
Italian class actions apply to breaches of contracts between consumers or users
and the same professional trader, as well as to non–contractual situations in which
consumers or users receive economic and non–economic relief as a consequence of
unfair commercial practices or defective products. Usually, situations in which a
contractual liability is involved evidence a functional relationship between two or
more similar contracts. Such a similarity depends on the fact that the same
professional trader is the common signatory to all those contracts. It further
depends on the fact that contracts between consumers or users and the professional
trader are contracts of adhesion. The superior contractual power of the professional
party to a contract of adhesion implies a standardization of contractual provisions.200
If the same professional trader is party to all contracts with a number of consumers
or users, there arises a legal and economic correlation among all contracts, at least
when they concern a similar type of product or service. This correlation reasonably
implies that when all contracts with the same professional trader contain arbitration
clauses authorizing the consumer or user to submit to arbitration all those class
disputes that arise from the performance of the contract, all signatory consumers or
users are entitled to intervene in, or opt–into, arbitration as class members. Their
claims must be similar to the claim of the class representatives, be against the same
199. See, e.g., Strong, supra note 196, at 937 (noting that ìconsolidated arbitrations, like consolidated
trials, share similar subject matter, involve common questions of law and fact, and determine similar
issues and defenses.ê (footnote omitted)); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty
Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA L. REV. 473, 505–06 (1987); Schwartz, supra
note 196, at 341; Stavros L. Brekoulakis, The Relevance of the Interests of Third Parties in Arbitration:
Taking a Closer Look at the Elephant in the Room, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1165 (2009); Code of Civil
Procedure, supra note 157, art. 105(1).
200. See, e.g., Fairfield, supra note 29, at 1408 (arguing that ìinformed consent is expensive, that
standardization is the best way to keep information costs low, and that consumers rationally prefer
standardized deals to idiosyncratic ones.ê); Issacharoff, supra note 137, at 388; but see Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay on Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1229 (1983) (ì[T]he
practice of using contracts of adhesion, and the consequences of that practice, are best seen neither as
results of the exercise of monopoly power nor merely as concomitants of mass production and mass
distribution, but rather as circumstances intimately linked to the specific organizational form in which
mass production and distribution most typically occur in our society.ê).
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producer or seller, involve the same type of contract, and encompass the same type
of contractual breach.
These implications are not different in kind from the implications of non–
contractual situations involving a wrongdoer and several victims of his harm.
According to Italian law, class disputes can arise even when the relationship
between litigants is not grounded in contract. Notwithstanding the absence of any
contractual relation, individual damages can also emerge as a direct result of the
wrongdoers negligence. When a professional trader commits the tort of negligence
in relation to a number of consumers or users, he tortuously breaches a duty of care
owed to them. These situations occur with some regularity, for instance, in cases
of product liability or unfair commercial or competitive practices. The functional
relationship between the wrongdoer on the one hand and consumers and users on
the other depends, in part, on (a) the potentially diffuse harmfulness of the
wrongdoers conduct, and (b) the fact that the wrongdoers conduct tends to
produce, either intentionally or recklessly, similar detrimental effects.
In the abovementioned cases, what grants consumers and users the ability to
participate in a pending class arbitration is more nuanced. The absence of any
contractual framework makes it inevitable that all potential parties to a class
arbitration will be contractually linked through more arbitration agreements. In
theory, if all parties agree to submit their disputes to class arbitration, there is no
legal obstacle to promoting a class arbitration. In practice, it is highly unlikely that
consumers or users will sign arbitration agreements with the wrongdoer when they
have already suffered damages or losses, partially because individual or collective
settlements might well satisfy their expectations. It is also unlikely that the
wrongdoer will treat the opportunity to submit all disputes to class arbitration as a
relevant factor in the protection of his confidentiality because of the massive nature
of class–wide arbitration.201
Further, both contractual and non–contractual situations display the same
degree of incompatibility between the claims of class representatives and class
members on the one hand and the position of the professional trader against which
the class representative has brought the class lawsuit on the other hand. What this
setting supplies is an element of continuity with the requirements of third–party
intervention in multiparty arbitrations. Italian arbitration law authorizes third–party
intervention when their claims or defenses are inconsistent with the original partys
claims or defenses.202 On this point, the claims or defenses of those parties who
decide to opt in to a class can be portrayed as assertions of contractual or non–
contractual rights against the same respondent. The assertions of class members are
compatible with the assertions of class representative(s) because they allege the
same type of breach of contract or legal duty.
Finally, once all arbitration agreements between the professional trader and
each consumer or user expressly provide that class disputes will be submitted to
arbitration, the participation of class members in the arbitration requires that third–
party interventions be specifically accepted by the original parties and the arbitral
201. StoltæNielsen, 559 U.S. at 22 (ìUnder the Class Rules, èthe presumption of privacy and
confidentiality that applies in many bilateral arbitrations èshall not apply in class arbitrations . . . thus
potentially frustrating the parties assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate.ê); Concepcion, 563 U.S.
at 348 (ìClasswide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different procedures
and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes more difficult.ê).
202. See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 157, art. 105(1).
43
Gaboardi: New Ways of Protecting Collective Interests: Italian Class Litiga
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
104 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2020
tribunal. In this way, the consensual nature of the proceeding receives the deference
to which it is entitled. Like the original parties to the arbitration, the class members
decide to participate in the arbitration on a voluntary basis. Similarly, the original
parties and the arbitral tribunal are called upon to accept the decision of each class
member to opt in to the class.
G. Notable Procedural Issues
It is worth reiterating that the class action is one of the most potentially
impactful components of the Italian system of judicial protection of individual and
collective interests. Even though its representative nature carries the potential to
increase judicial efficiency both in terms of consistency from case to case and in
terms of expenditure of judicial resources, the Italian class action faces risks of least
restrictive interpretation and understatement. Is it possible to conceptualize class
action arbitration as a consistent development of class–wide litigation? The answer
to that question, which depends on whether the primary characteristics of Italian
class actions are compatible with the consensual basis of arbitral proceedings,
presents serious challenges that may immobilize the Italian academic debate.
By undertaking the analysis of class arbitration within the Italian legal system,
Section I provided legislative and procedural arguments for gauging class
arbitration and its consistency with the Italian rules on arbitral proceedings. First,
the issue of immediate concern is whether class arbitration is consistent with Italian
law notwithstanding Italian rules on class actions, which are silent on class
arbitration. To reiterate, an analysis of the pervasiveness of class disputes or
soundness of class actions in the Italian legal system is possible even absent a
legislative enactment expressly authorizing class arbitration. Second, when the
question arises as to whether it would be possible to conceptualize a right for class
members to opt in to class membership within an arbitral proceeding, the answer
requires an appeal to the Italian rules on intervention of third parties in ongoing
arbitrations. In particular, given the existence of structural similarities between the
claims of class members and those of class representatives, it may be thought to
authorize class member participation in a pending arbitration through the consent
of all concerned.
Another set of questions that sometimes arises involves some procedural
technicalities of the Italian class action.203 This category includes: (i) the role class
members decisions to opt in to class membership are entitled to play; (ii) the
tension between the regulatory regime of such declaration and the rules governing
the third–party intervention in multiparty arbitrations; and (iii) the critical role that
the public prosecutor has to play when the court is called upon to decide the
suitability of a class action.
According to the Consumer Code, class members are entitled to opt in to the
class. In other words, class members are asked to demonstrate that their claims
against the respondent refer to the same type of breach of contract or legal duty. In
this way, class actions certified under article 140–bis of the Consumer Code have a
binding effect on those class members who opted in to the class and whom the court
recognized as members. Though the written declarations can be deemed integral to
protecting individual consent to a class action, they cannot be described as
203. See Briguglio, supra note 147, at 226; Gaboardi, supra note 147, at 1007.
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ìcomplaintsê; only the named plaintiff can properly assert a claim in which a
demand for relief against the respondent is included. By contrast, class members
provide the court and their opponent with the grounds upon which their claims rest.
By presenting their claims, class members reveal their consent to class action or, in
the words of Italian law, their ìadesioneê (acceptance) of class action.204
There is little practical difference between the complaint of the class
representative and the declaration of a class member. While the motion of class
representatives must be served on the respondent no later than twenty days prior to
the hearing on the motion, the declarations of class members must be filed with the
court within a reasonable time after class certification.205 Even so, the distinction
between complaint and declaration implies that it is only the claim of class
representatives that can be defined as the request seeking an order on the merits.
Despite this implication, both class representatives and class members are equally
bound by the judgment. The declarations of class members have no effect other
than to accept the judgment on the merits. By accepting the class action, class
members implicitly waive any individual lawsuit for money damages or restitution
against the respondent.206 In the end, the role of class members might be described
as joint participation in class litigation, while acknowledging they cannot play any
proper role as parties to the proceedings. Even though class members must provide
a copy of all documents used to support their claims, they cannot act in the
proceedings, they can only wait for the judgment.
This approach to the role of class members is a sort of deference to individual
consent to litigate within the context of representative litigation, but it could pose a
serious obstacle to class action arbitration. If class members are destined to play a
limited role in class disputes, it could make it difficult to treat them as third parties
who are entitled to intervene in the arbitration. According to Italian law, the
intervention of third parties in conventional, non–representative litigation or
arbitration is generally deemed a precursor to seeking an order on their complaint,
which is precisely what class members cannot seek under the Italian rules on class
litigation, as those class members are only entitled to accept the judgment on the
merits.207
Ultimately, however, it is perfectly reasonable to consider class members as
third parties who intervene in the arbitration even though they play a more limited
role than third parties who intervene in a multiparty, but not–class, arbitration.
Rules on intervention constitute a useful framework for fuller appreciation of the
conditions, such as the functional relationship among claims or the consent to
arbitration of all concerned, that justify the joinder of class members. Even if article
140–bis(10) of the Consumer Code expressly forbids third–party intervention in an
ongoing class proceeding, it can be viewed as necessary to reconcile the opt–in basis
204. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(3).
205. Whether the time between class certification and filing is reasonable is a question left to the
discretion of the court. Nevertheless, Italian law requires that class members declarations be filed with
the clerk of court within 120 days after the publication of notice of class certification in newspapers or
periodicals that are of general circulation in a particular province or city. See Consumer Code, supra
note 37, arts. 140–bis(3), (9)(b).
206. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(3).
207. Although Italian law authorizes third parties to intervene even when they simply want to support
one of the original parties without any direct request for the court, this situation is not relevant to class
action because class members aim to support exclusively their own claims. See Code of Civil Procedure,
supra note 157, arts. 105(2), 816–quinquies(2).
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of class actions with its representative nature. Indeed, Italian law bans using third
parties intervention in a class–wide proceeding because the possibility to opt in to
class membership would otherwise be discouraged.208
Finally, according to article 140–bis(5) of the Consumer Code, the complaints
of class representatives must be served not only on the respondent, but also on the
attorney general.209 Generally, when a legislative act authorizes public authority to
intervene in civil proceedings, it is relevant for purposes of protection of public
interests, such as prosecuting violations of criminal laws. In these cases, the
relevance of public interests is viewed as a substantive reason for asserting that a
dispute cannot be submitted to arbitration. The consensual nature of arbitration
reflects the substantive interests that require protection through arbitration.210
Given the characterization of arbitration agreements as a matter of discretion rather
than compulsion, parties can involve only private rights in arbitration procedures.
Public interests, on the other hand, remain a matter of civil or criminal litigation.
Therefore, when the attorney general is called upon to participate in a civil
proceeding under existing rules of procedure, the legal system responds by
establishing a presumption in favor of the public nature of the interests involved in
the proceedings. Such a presumption thus entails that, despite having signed an
arbitration agreement, the parties cannot submit a dispute to arbitration when legal
rules dictate the intervention of the attorney general.
Article 140–bis(5) of the Consumer Code requires that the complaints of class
representatives be served to the attorney general. That again raises the question of
whether the rule seriously impedes parties ability to submit their disputes to class
arbitration. Answering that question requires a distinction between those situations
in which the attorney general has been served with a copy of the complaint and
those in which the attorney general, once served, has decided to intervene in the
ongoing arbitration. In the former situation, the class arbitration will continue
because the intervention of attorney general is merely potential; even when he is
served with a copy of the complaint, he is not obliged to intervene. In these cases,
the service is required as a means of informing the attorney general that a party has
chosen to seek class certification. By contrast, when the attorney general attempts
to intervene in a class–wide arbitration, his intervention creates the risk of
paralyzing the procedure because the nature of the dispute would suddenly change.
A strong argument exists that this rule should be amended because participation
of the attorney general in a class litigation is irrelevant to prosecuting the respondent
for violations of criminal law. It would be more reasonable to expect the attorney
general to be served with a copy of the complaint rather than to grant him the ability
to intervene in the civil proceedings. Even so, the role of the attorney general can
be considered as consistent with class arbitration under existing rules. Placing
article 140–bis(5) of the Consumer Code and article 818 of the Code of Civil
Procedure211 side by side suggests a solution to the question of the intervention of
208. For the Italian debate, see Gaboardi, supra note 147, at 1007–08.
209. See Consumer Code, supra note 37, art. 140–bis(5).
210. See, e.g., Cappelletti, supra note 26, at 799 (ìIn France, Belgium, and Italy, for instance, the
Ministre public [i.e., the attorney general] has the power to participate in any suit in which he recognizes
an element of public interest or ordre public; yet in areas where the public interest is in great need of a
forceful representative–as in consumer and environmental protection matters–the Ministre public has
done very little.ê (footnotes omitted)).
211. See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 157, art. 818; see also Consumer Code, supra note 126,
art. 140–bis(5).
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the attorney general. The latter rule is widely debated by Italian scholars because
it provides that arbitral tribunals are not capable of making interim orders unless
expressly authorized by law. According to Italian law, it is consistent with the
arbitration agreement for a party to request interim orders from a court before or
during the arbitral proceeding. The arbitration will be temporarily suspended until
the time of judgment from the court. Likewise, when the attorney general who has
been served with a copy of the complaint asks to intervene in class–wide arbitration,
the procedure should be suspended until the court has certified the class. Article
140–bis(5) of the Consumer Code allows the attorney general to intervene in a class
litigation until the court will make the certification decision.212 Though uselessly
complicated, these two suggestions constitute the simplest step toward the
resolution of a thorny issue under existing rules.
V. CONCLUSION
Although resistance to moving away from an ìindividual–subjectivityê model
of litigation exists, the protection of collective interests in the Italian legal system
is expanding significantly toward the model of representative litigation.
Representative litigation under Italian law is a useful, but limited means of
achieving objectives such as equal and consistent protection of collective interests.
Italian law imposes rigorous restrictions on the scope of representative litigation.
In this way, the new regulatory regimes breed cautionary interpretations by
reducing the ability of judges and scholars to develop the potential of legal texts.
Class arbitration can be viewed as reinforcing the protection of collective
interests. According to Italian law, the representative nature of class actions
prevents stakeholders from entirely bearing the costs of bringing individual
lawsuits, while the opt–in mechanism increases the efficacy of class actions by
promoting not only individual goals (such as a relevant reduction in the individual
costs of litigation or a consistent treatment of individual claims), but also wide–
ranging collective objectives (such as legal certainty and social justice). Admitting
that class disputes can be submitted to arbitration advances those individual and
collective benefits. Even if class arbitration tends to limit the confidentiality of
respondents,213 it can engender relevant advantages in terms of its positive effects
on the length of proceedings and the complexity of discovery. Given time, its effect
can be pervasive because the consensual nature of arbitration allows arbitrators to
manage the ongoing proceeding in a more discretionary way than judges. That said,
class arbitration is also characterized by a reduced impact of discovery because
class disputes generally deal with liability for breach of consumer contracts or
contracts of adhesion with the same producer.214 Finally, it represents a significant
212. See Consumer Code, supra note 126, art. 140–bis(5); Gaboardi, supra note 147, at 1008.
213. StoltæNielsen, 559 U.S. at 22 (ìUnder the Class Rules, èthe presumption of privacy and
confidentiality that applies in many bilateral arbitrations èshall not apply in class arbitrations . . . thus
potentially frustrating the parties assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate.ê); Concepcion, 563 U.S.
at 348 (ìClasswide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and different procedures
and involving higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes more difficult.ê).
214. See Consumer Code, supra note 126, art. 140–bis(2). When class disputes deal with non–
contractual liability including tort and product liability, the role of discovery is significantly increased.
Nevertheless, arbitrators who are asked to decide both contractual and non–contractual cases will
invariably take into account some common questions of law or fact. The representative nature of class
actions implies some legal or factual similarities between two or more claims. The burden of proving
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alternative to individual and representative litigation in promoting an effective
protection of collective interests within legal systems, such as the Italian one, in
which both judicial and arbitral systems revolve around the ìindividual
subjectivityê characterization.
Contending that class arbitration is applicable within the Italian legal system
presents the problem of interpretative adequacy. Italian law authorizes class actions
against a respondent, regardless of whether those disputes can be submitted to
arbitration. Nevertheless, the determinants of arbitration primarily include the
individual consent of the parties to the arbitration agreement. Its prevailing role
implies that an arbitration agreement can overcome the normative silence on class
arbitration. Even though certain procedural features of arbitration require
interpretative adjustments in order to discharge civil lawyers obligations to
rigorously respect the written law, the inquiry into class action arbitration brings the
foundational drivers of arbitration to the forefront. The consensual nature of
arbitration is served by the existence of arbitration agreements that explicitly
authorize class actions. The existing rules on third–party intervention warrant
reconciling the opt–in basis of class actions with the basic legal principles of
arbitration. Therefore, class action arbitration is a viable alternative within the
Italian legal system.215
the material facts in which the named plaintiff and class members place their claims tends to be eased
by those similarities. See supra Section IV(F).
215. The Italian Parliament recently enacted a new regulatory regime of class action by amending the
Code of Civil Procedure. See Italian law on class action, Apr. 12, 2019, Pub. L. No. 31 (It.). It will enter
into force in April 2020 and will abrogate the class litigation ruled by the Consumer Code. While the
new Italian class action continues to proceed on an opt–in basis, its scope significantly changes. The
new class litigation will be not only a way of protecting the interests of consumers or users, but it will
become a general way of implementing individual protection by applying to the court. Indeed, the new
regulatory regime will allow individuals or organizations to bring lawsuits for money damages or
restitution on behalf of the class against a wrongdoer. Therefore, the scope of the new Italian class action
is now limited to those situations that are expressly determined by consumer law, but it can be defined
as broad and general. Any situations in which the stakeholder can assert a violation of an individual
right is entitled to bring such collective redress on behalf of the class. The homogeneity among the
situation in which the representative plaintiff was involved and situations in which class members are
individually involved is the new requirement for the certification of class action. On the procedural
ground, class members are entitled to adhere to class litigation not only in a preliminary moment during
the litigation, but also when the collective case has already been decided on the merits. Moreover,
according to the new law, the complaint of the class representative must be served only on the
respondent, while there is no longer any need to serve it on the attorney general. See supra Section
IV(G). Finally, the new features of class action do not foreclose the same conclusions reached above
about the workability of class arbitration within the Italian legal system.
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